U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, "Hearing: China's Proliferation Practices and Role in the North Korea Crisis," March 10, 2005

March 10, 2005
Room 562 Dirksen Senate Office Building
First Street and Constitution Avenue,
NE Washington, D.C.

Co-Chairs: Commissioners Carolyn Bartholomew, Fred D. Thompson and Larry M. Wortzel

Opening Statement of C. Richard D’Amato, Chairman

Good morning and welcome to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s hearing on China’s Proliferation Practices and Role in the North Korea Crisis. Our hearing is being co-chaired by Commissioners Carolyn Bartholomew, Fred Thompson, and Larry Wortzel. These issues are important to the Congress, which has directed that we review them in our governing statute.

Our mandate calls on us to assess China’s role in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to terrorist-sponsoring states. As we have stressed in our reports to the Congress, proliferation stemming from China remains a serious concern. Have the Chinese taken decisive actions to reign in the various companies engaging in this behavior, some of which have been repeatedly sanctioned by the U.S.? We believe China must face this issue frankly and effectively.

Washington also must act to impose consequences on Beijing, should it not cooperate on this vital matter. Currently the U.S. employs sanctions in hopes of curbing the proliferating habits of some of China’s largest companies, but U.S. sanctions laws have failed to stem this behavior, and do  not penalize the Chinese government for its lack of action to end it.  Ultimately, the Chinese government itself must be held accountable for a WMD-related attack which involves, either directly or indirectly, materials or technologies originating in China.

In addition to proliferation, we will examine China’s role in the North Korea nuclear crisis. North Korea is also guilty of repeated acts of proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems, behavior which should be well within the capability of China to mitigate or end. Last month, the North Koreans withdrew abruptly from the Six-Party Talks and announced that they possessed nuclear weapons.

Earlier this week The New York Times reported that the Chinese Foreign Minister challenged the fundamental American assumptions about the dangers of the North Korean program, challenged the quality of U.S. intelligence, and essentially walked away from any role to pressure the North Koreans into reaching a real agreement. This statement has since been “clarified,” basically denied, by the Chinese government which said that it is committed to maintaining and strengthening the Six-Part Talks.

Given this confusion, it is important that the Chinese leaders understand that Beijing’s cooperation and leadership in solving the North Korea nuclear issue is the single most important aspect and litmus test of the so-called U.S.-China “strategic” relationship. A recent national poll of Americans indicated that 81% thought the North Koreans have nuclear weapons and 70% believe North Korea is a threat to the U.S. Americans cannot afford to wait for Chinese action on this issue. The time for action is now.

China currently is seeking a larger role as a global leader.  Whether it grows into such a global role will depend to a large degree on whether it takes positive and effective actions in the Six- Party Talks, and uses its full leverage to moderate North Korea’s behavior.

I will now turn over the proceedings to our Vice-Chairman, Roger Robinson.

Opening Statement of Roger W. Robinson, Jr., Vice-Chairman

Good morning ladies and gentlemen.
    
As Vice-Chairman of the Commission, I join Chairman D’Amato in welcoming our many esteemed witnesses today.  I also share his urgent concern about the issues at hand today. The foreign policy of the United States currently confronts numerous pressing issues. One is WMD and ballistic missile-related proliferation and the fear that the ability to manufacture and deliver WMD eventually could arrive in the hands of terrorist groups. China’s role in stopping such proliferation is vital, especially given that Chinese entities continue to transfer such equipment and technology to terrorist-sponsoring states such as Iran. Indeed, on balance, China continues to be a sizeable part of the problem, not the solution.

The coverage of today’s hearing on both Chinese proliferation practices and China’s role in the North Korea crisis was intentional.  Though separate policy issues, they are directly linked. The threat of ballistic missile strikes against U.S. interests in the Middle East exists because of Chinese and North Korean transfers and programmatic support. Each amplifies and exacerbates the effect of the other. We do not know what the future holds in terms of Chinese and North Korean governmental support for these and other  programs – and that is a very disquieting reality.

Chinese involvement in WMD and ballistic missile programs around the world has undergone some change in recent years.  Chinese government officials now publicly state that China does not support the development of weapons of mass destruction by any country and is becoming more active in select non-proliferation regimes, notably concerning nuclear materials. It is important to remember, however, that because of past Chinese patronage of WMD and ballistic missile programs, the ability of several countries of concern to develop weapons that can have devastating results has been enhanced and accelerated. Because of that direct involvement we remain concerned about the ability of the central government to effectively control the illicit transfers of WMD and ballistic missile-related technologies by Chinese firms.
 
It is well known that China was instrumental in the development of some of Iran’s WMD and missile programs from the provision of chemical weapons precursors to ballistic missiles and associated production facilities.  China also directly assisted Iran in the development of its nuclear weapons infrastructure. China’s hand is also clearly visible in both Pakistan’s missile and nuclear programs – it has been widely reported that China provided actual nuclear warhead designs to Pakistan. China’s on-going support of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program continues to have unfortunate but predictable consequences.  We have learned since Libya’s renunciation of its nuclear program that Pakistani designs had been provided to Libya. Beyond unilateral U.S. sanctions against Chinese firms that proliferate, what can the United States or its allies do to effectively encourage China to take decisive action against Chinese proliferators and to strengthen further export controls?

Additionally, the continued missile modernization programs of both China and Iran raise concerns. Recent press reports indicate that Ukraine has supplied China and Iran with long-range cruise missiles.  The long-term impact of these transfers still needs to be assessed; however, these transfers illustrate the global repercussions when irresponsible governments take steps for political or economic reasons that run counter to the nonproliferation standards of the international community.

North Korea continues to be a central foreign policy and national security concern. Its withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks, its declaration that it possesses nuclear weapons and its direct involvement in the missile programs of seemingly every major country of concern continues to alarm policy-makers here and abroad. There is now little question that China’s role in arresting and irreversibly dismantling North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs will serve as the litmus test for improved U.S.-China relations, and probably Beijing’s relations with Japan. China’s continued sale of problematic items to Iran, particularly those destined for its missile programs, shall likewise implicate our entire bilateral relationship in light of the growing dangers posed by Iran’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs.

Today’s discussions are serious, the issues urgent, and the likely consequences global. We are fortunate to have both Executive and Legislative branch witnesses providing their views as well as experts from academia and the private sector to convey to the Commission the insights derived from their study of these major security challenges. Thank you.

OPENING STATEMENTS
OPENING STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN C. RICHARD D’AMATO
OPENING STATEMENT BY VICE CHAIRMAN ROGER W. ROBINSON, JR.
OPENING STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER FRED THOMPSON
OPENING STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER CAROLYN BARTHOLOMEW
OPENING STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER LARRY WORTZEL

CHINA'S PROLIFERATION PRACTICES
Panel I: Congressional Perspectives
Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)

Panel II: Administration Perspectives
The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control
The Honorable Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Panel III: Recent Developments and Implications
Dr. Daniel A. Pinkston, Director, The East Asia Nonproliferation Program, The Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (Monterey, CA)
Mr. Gary Milhollin, Director, The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control (Washington, DC)
The Honorable Ashton Carter, Professor of Science and International Affairs, The John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (Cambridge, MA)

CHINA'S ROLE IN THE NORTH KOREA CRISIS
Panel IV: Congressional Perspectives
Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA)
Congressman Solomon P. Ortiz (D-TX)

Panel V: Recent Developments and Implications
Mr. Selig Harrison, Director, The Asia Program, The Center for International Policy (Washington, DC)
Ms. Balbina Hwang, Policy Analyst, The Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation (Washington, DC)
Mr. Henry Sokolski, Executive Director, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (Washington, DC)

Panel VI: Administration Perspectives
The Honorable Joseph DeTrani, Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks, U.S. Department of State