Liang, "Regime type and international negotiation: A case study of United States/China bilateral negotiations for China's accession to GATT/WTO," 2003

Wei Liang, Ph.D.

Abstract (Summary)
Despite the widespread interest in the effects of domestic political institutions on the international behaviors of the state, however, remarkably few studies have expanded that interest into the study of international economic cooperation between two regime types in the post Cold-War era. The unique function and interaction of domestic institutions and the coordination of policy preferences of domestic actors by a mixed dyad is the central focus of this case study. Negotiation process is examined through the lens of domestic interplay within two regime types and the interaction between them. The particular empirical puzzle, however, is why China's GATT/WTO accession negotiation took as long as it did and how the negotiation outcomes could be explained as the consequence of the negotiation process. My central claim is that in international economic negotiations it is more difficult for a democratic country and a non-democratic country (mixed pair) to reach an agreement than do two democratic countries, and in order for the agreement to be reached, the preferences of the executive and business group must converge and the lobbying effort of the interest groups must be stronger in this situation than that required by negotiation on the same matter between two democracies to counterbalance the legislative resistance derived from ideological concerns. The higher degree of difficulty is not only caused by the different domestic institutional features (polyarchy in the democratic state and hierarchy in the non-democratic state) but also by the inescapable resistance of domestic political actors (executive and Congress) derived from the ideological concern. Consequently, political/security/ideologically considerations inevitably will interweave with commercial consideration in international trade negotiations between a mixed pair. This dissertation will be a good addition to the current research interests in 'Democratic Difference'. It should contribute to a broader understanding of the political economy of trade policy. It should also shed some light on the studies of the integration of transition economies into multilateralism.

Advisor: Odell, John