A number of states have enacted laws prohibiting Chinese and others from “countries of concern” from purchasing homes or land.
Congressional Research Service, “U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress,” June 12, 2014
Click here to view reports from another year:
July 2014 | June 2014 | November 2013 | July 2013 | March 2013 | November 2012 | October 2012 | June 2012 | July 2010 | August 2009 | April 2009 | March 2009 | May 2005
This CRS report, updated as warranted, discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, the Clinton Administration reengaged with the top PRC leadership, including China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral relations have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP- 3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and aggressive maritime confrontations (including in 2009).
Issues for Congress include whether the Administration complies with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and pursues contacts with the PLA that advance a prioritized set of U.S. security interests, especially the operational safety of U.S. military personnel. Oversight legislation includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991 (P.L. 101-246) and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65). A particular issue is whether the President is required to issue waivers of sanctions. Skeptics and proponents of military exchanges with the PRC have debated whether the contacts achieve results in U.S. objectives and whether the contacts contribute to the PLA’s warfighting capability that might harm U.S. and allied security interests. Some have argued about whether the value that U.S. officials place on the contacts overly extends leverage to the PLA. Some believe talks can serve U.S. interests that include conflict avoidance/crisis management; military-civilian coordination; transparency and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; talks on nuclear, missile, space, and/or cyber domains; counterterrorism; and POW/MIA accounting.
Policy makers could review the approach to mil-to-mil contacts, given concerns about potential crises and conflicts. U.S. officials have faced challenges in gaining cooperation from the PLA. The PLA has tried to use its suspensions of exchanges while blaming U.S.-only “obstacles”(including arms sales to Taiwan, FY2000 NDAA, and air and naval reconnaissance operations).
The PRC’s harassment of U.S. ships and increasing assertiveness in maritime disputes showed some limits to mil-to-mil engagement, similar views, and PLA restraint. The U.S. articulations in 2011-2012 of a strategic “rebalancing” to the Asia-Pacific raised an issue of how to deal with China’s challenges. The Administration’s “rebalance” entails not only an expansion of engagement with the PLA, but also increasing exercises. The PLA Navy’s invited participation for the first time in the U.S. Navy-led multinational exercise, RIMPAC, near Hawaii in summer 2014 has raised concerns in Congress and elsewhere. The U.S. Navy has increased some “interoperability” with the PLA Navy. The Defense Secretary issued the latest required annual report on June 5, 2014, concerning military and security developments involving the PRC, cooperation, and military-to-military contacts. The report noted that the PLA uses combined exercises to improve capabilities by learning from more advanced militaries and asserted that the Defense Department complies with the FY2000 NDAA in all military contacts with China.
Legislation in the 113th Congress includes the FY2014 NDAA (P.L. 113-66); FY2014 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 2397); Asia-Pacific Region Priority Act, H.R. 4495 (Forbes); and FY2015 NDAA, H.R. 4435 (McKeon), and S. 2410 (Levin).
Chinese companies are among the world's largest video game firms. They are on the move in some of the fastest growing markets.
Throughout its history, the Chinese Communist Party has sought to dictate what is written and taught about its past. And some have always found ways to offer a fuller picture of what they and others have experienced.