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Authority WDP 009032
By WDP NARA Date 2/1/01

TELCON
The President/Mr. Kissinger
8:18 p.m., April 27, 1971


- P: I had a couple of thoughts on this. One with regard to the Bruce thing which seems to me may pose to them a difficult problem because of him being directly involved in the Vietnam negotiations. Secondly, let me think of whether there is something else -- how about Nelson?
- K: No.
- P: Can't do it, huh?
- K: Mr. President, he wouldn't be disciplined enough, although he is a possibility.
- P: It would engulf him in a big deal and he is outside of the Government, you see.
- K: Let me think about it, I might be able to hold him in check.
- P: It is intriguing, don't you think?
- K: It is intriguing.
- P: How about Bush?
- K: Absolutely not, he is too soft and not sophisticated enough.
- P: I thought of that myself.
- K: I thought about Richardson but he wouldn't be the right thing.
- P: He is still too close to us and [I don't think it would set well with Rogers]. Nelson -- the Chinese would consider him important and he would be -- could do a lot for us in terms of the domestic situation. No, Nelson is a wild hair running around.
- K: I think for one operation I could keep him under control. To them a Rockefeller is a tremendous thing.
- P: Sure. Well, keep it in the back of your head.
- K: Bush would be too weak.
- P: I thought so too but I was trying to think of somebody with a title.

Authority WDP 009037
By WDP NARA Date 2/1/01

APR 27 1971
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

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- K: Nelson has possibilities.
- P: A possibility, yeah. Of course, that would drive State up the wall.
- K: He would take someone from State along but he despises them so much he will take our direction and I would send someone from our staff to go along.
- P: Send Haig. Really, he's really tough.
- K: And he knows Haig.
- P: Henry, it wouldn't have happened if you hadn't stuck to your guns. We played a game and we got a little break. It was done skillfully and now we will wait a couple of weeks.
- K: We have done it now, we have got it all hooked together; Berlin is hooked to SALT. Nelson might be able to do it, particularly if I sent Haig.
- P: Oh, we would have to have Haig; and a State guy but not that Green guy.
- K: Oh, Green could go. On foreign policy, Nelson would take my advice.
- P: He would be a special envoy in a sense.
- K: Actually, Mr. President, that's a very original idea and he's tough.
- P: Particularly if you get him in right at the mountain top and say look, it will make or break you, boy.
- K: Oh, he would do it and I could tell him on this one. On the long operation he would be hard to control but on this one he would be good.
- P: If Dewey were alive, he could do it.
- K: Nelson would be better.
- P: But Dewey isn't alive.
- K: If you can hold on a minute, I can get you -- I have the oral note that the Pakistans sent me. Here it is -- the Pakistan note to Yahya which Yahya passed onto the Chinese that asked him (read portion of note -- In reply to questions from me, Mr. Kissinger said



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P: They opened that up on Taiwan.

K: On this ambiguous formulations could make that clear in the exchange and announcements.

P: Their reply is can not come over and talk about Taiwan. There is no limit to that because there is no meeting.

K: The difference between them and the Russians is that if your drop some loose change, when you go to pick it up the Russians will step on your fingers and the Chinese won't. I have reviewed all the communications with them and it has been on a high leve.

P: Yeah, they have.

K: The Russians squeeze us on every bloody move and it has just been stupid. They cannot trick us out of Taiwan, they have to have a fundamental understanding.

P: Put Nelson in the back of your head. What did Haig think about this?

K: He thinks it is a great diplomatic move and if we play it coolly and toughly as we have until now, we can settle everything.

P: He said that.

K: Mr. President, I have not said this before but I think if we get this thing working, we will end Vietnam this year. The mere fact of these contacts makes that.

P: Another thing, of course, our little problem of time. In terms of wanting to announce --

K: We ought to be able to announce it by the first week in June anyway.

P: We would have to if we are going to be there in June. Is SALT going to turn them off?

K: No, no.

P: Particularly, if we are going to drag our feet with the Russians on the Summit. They are fiddling around with it; well, let them fiddle.


K: They won't move fast because of the protests in this country. A more sophisticated analysis of the report was made by Chou en Lai.



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- P: His analysis in effect realized what we were doing.
- K: A very subtle analysis of the international situation.
- P: Well, anyway, there is another player we can keep. Bruce is another possibility too. It would be quite dramatic to pull Bruce out of Paris and send him to Peking.
- K: For that reason, they might not take him.
- P: In terms of Bruce, he is our senior Ambassador and we feel he is the best qualified man.
- K: They would jump at Rockefeller, a high visibility one.
- P: Visibility and it would be enormous. Can't you just see what that would do to the Libs in this country, oh, God. Rockefeller over there, Jesus Christ.
- K: That has great possibilities.
- P: Here is Rockefeller -- he is lined up with us all the way; he has lined up with us on foreign policy all the way. Anyway, that is something to think about.
- K: That's a good problem to have.
- P: It is a good luxury to have.
- K: Once this gets going -- everything is beginning to fit together.
- P: I hope so.
- K: You will have to hold hard on Vietnam on Thursday.
- P: I intend to hold it hard. What's happening on the prisoners?
- K: I have three proposals which I am putting in writing -- they will release 1,000, they are opening their camps and calling on the North Vietnamese to do the same, and proposing that all prisoners be held in a neutral country. This should be announced by Bruce in the morning --
- P: Good.



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- K: And you can hit it in the evening.
- P: They might hit that play if we build it up a bit. They will all think it is about bugging out but it will be on prisoners.
- K: We are beginning to hold the cards.
- P: That's true but we are going to hold it. The demonstrators may overplay their hand.
- K: John Chancellor, whom I had lunch with today, thinks the tide has turned.
- P: What turned it?
- K: He thinks what happened this week has ruined them.
- P: John Chancellor
- K: Absolutely. He doesn't exactly know what you have up your sleeve but --
- P: I am not saying anything about China except that the proposals are at a very sensitive stage and I don't intend to comment on the future and next question, gentlemen.
- K: Right.
- P: I don't want to get into the proposal of a two-China policy, UN membership, Taiwan and so forth. I am going to finesse all questions by saying that developments here are significant and I don't think the interests of the nation will be served by commenting on it further.
- K: I think that would be the best position to take, Mr. President.
- P: Haig was pretty pleased.
- K: If anyone had predicted that two months ago, we would have thought it was inconceivable.
- P: Yeah, yeah. After Laos --
- K: After Cambodia, the same thing --



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P: Yeah. But look at after Laos, the people over two to one thought it had failed and yet here comes the Chinese move, the Ping Pong team and something more significant that pales that into nothing. It can have an enormous significance. Well, look, Nelson's tongue made that statement to Snow. How can we get the Mansfield thing turned off. I don't know how we can do it but one way we could do it is to invite him to go along.

K: No. Why give this to him?

P: He could go along with me.

K: He can go along with you when you go.

P: We could invite Mansfield and Scott.

K: If you want to share it with the Democrats.

P: Share it; the Chinese will treat them very well but they will know where the power is.

K: But they actually haven't invited anyone yet.

P: Could you get a message to him?

K: Think I can get some oral message to him.

P: Two weeks' away and I wonder if they will move on Mansfield before then.

K: No, but they may.

P: As a temporary action, can you say that the President will be in California and --

K: I have already told them and that a constructive reply will be coming.

P: If you could add to that, that any other visits should be held in abeyance until we give our reply.

K: I will get that across.

P: There will be many requests and we feel that political requests
.....

K: Right.

P: Good idea. Okay. Henry.

K: Right, Mr. President.