
· MEMORANDUM



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:

Meeting Between the President, Ambassador

Chow and Henry A. Kissinger

TIME & PLACE:

April 12, 1971; 11:30 a.m.; The President's Office

Ambassador Chow who is leaving his position to return to Taipei as Foreign Minister came in at what was originally a courtesy call but because of the visit of the Ping Pong Team to China has taken on added significance. Ambassador Chow began the meeting by thanking the President for his many courtesies and saying he wanted the President to know that he always understood that the President and I were the best friends of China in this Administration.

The President said, "I want you to convey my warmest greetings to Generalissimo and Madam Chiang. We will stick by our treaty commitments to Taiwan; we will honor them. I said so in my State of the World Report. We will do nothing in the trade and travel field which is in deryogation of friendship to your President and to Madam Chiang. On the other hand, we will take some steps in the next few days that are primarily to be seen as part of our world perspective, particularly vis-a-vis the Soviet Union." [Note: The President said this because he

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thought it would be an unbearable loss of face for the Ambassador to begin his career as foreign minister having seen the President and not being warned of impending relaxations.

The President continued, "On the UN membership issue, some of our friends have deserted us. We are prepared to fight for you but we want to do it in an effective way. I have many proposals on various schemes such as dual representation. I will make this decision, not the State Department. Some people say, let's find a clever way of doing it, but there is no clever way of being defeated. There is no change in our basic position, but there may have to be some adaptation of our strategy. We, however, before we make a decision want to talk to you. I am sending Ambassador Murphy to Taiwan; he is going there on business anyway, and the Generalissimo should talk to him as he talks to me. Taiwan and the UN is a fact of life for us and we will do nothing to give it up, but we have to be intelligent and we want to hear your views."

Chow said, "We appreciate your special attention; above all, don't spread the impression that all is lost." The President then asked me to explain the choices on China representation, and I summed up the memorandum that I had written to him on the subject (copy attached). The President asked Chow for his analysis.

Chow said, "We could stick them out for Universality plus the Important Question." I said, "Will the IQ carry and Universality lose?"

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Chow said, "No, this depends on how it is formulated." He then raised this issue of the Senkaku Islands. It has to do with the protection of the Chinese Nationalist interests. If Taiwan can do that, then intellectuals and overseas Chinese will feel they must go to the other side. The State Department statement insisting that this is part of Okinawa has had violent repercussions. This will get a movement of overseas Chinese. The President said, "I want you to know that the relaxation of trade that we are planning is mostly symbolic; the important issue is the UN. We will be very much influenced by what the Generalissimo will think. As long as I am here, you have a friend in the White House and you should do nothing to embarrass him. The Chinese should look at the subtleties. You help us and we will help you. I want Murphy to bring his report personally to me. We will stand firm as long as we can, but we must have an army behind us.

After an exchange of pleasantries, the meeting ended. [End of tape.]

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ACTION April 9, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE FRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT:

Chinese Representation at the United Nations

The primary issue is whether to continue with the current policy aimed at keeping Peking out and Taipei in (the Vice President's preference) at the risk of defeat this year or next, or shift to a new policy aimed at preventing -- or at least deferring -- Taiwan's expulsion (State's preference). The necessity for a joint policy with Taiwan makes it desirable to defer final decisions on this issue until your personal representative -- hopefully Bob Murphy -- has talked the whole problem out with Chiang Kai-shek.


The need for speed. It is important, however, to complete that process as quickly as possible, for there is a growing momentum working against us in the international community. In recent months, Ethiopia, Canada, Italy, Nigeria, Chile and Equatorial Guinea have recognized Peking as the only legitimate government of China. This week Kuwait joined that list, and five others are now negotiating with Peking. If we are going to try to hold some line at the UN, we need to approach our friends before any more of them get frozen into postures which preclude cooperation with us. Otherwise, we are in danger of losing the ballgame during the seventh inning stretch.

The immediate question for decision is how, and with what, to approach Chiang. Frankly, I do not see much point in sending a representative to Chiang merely to discuss in general terms the problem and the possibility of a new policy. Such talks will surely result in the need for further talks, and we do not have the time for prolonged palaver.

Instead, your representative should present to Chiang the precise alternatives as you see them, and bring back to you Chiang's precise views on them. This means that we must decide now which specific new strategy we are prepared to consider, provided Chiang will cooperate.

State believes that a change of policy is worthwhile, even if it only staves off expulsion for a year or so. I do not agree. That position does not adequately reflect your concern for the domestic reaction. Moreover, such a "change"

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
is not really very different from sticking with our current policy. Both result, sooner or later, in Taiwan's expulsion. I do not think Chiang will seriously consider such an "alternative".

It seems to me, therefore, that a new policy is worth considering if -- but only if -- it has a real chance of preventing Taiwan's expulsion for the foreseeable future -- not just for a year or two. I believe there is one strategy which may -- I am not sure it will -- serve that purpose. Its elements are as follows:

- 1. Universality. I would include universality for three reasons: (a) it should make a change of policy slightly more palatable to Chiang, (b) it would provide us with a principle and a good debating point, internationally for retaining Taiwan's seat, and domestically for our change of policy, and (c) it might win us a few votes at the UN.
- 2. <u>Dual Representation.</u> Given the UN sentiment, there is no prospect for saving Taiwan's seat with a policy which continues to bar Peking's membership. Dual representation is, therefore, an essential part of any strategy to save Taiwan's seat.
- 3. A Modified Important Question Resolution Limited to the Expulsion of Taiwan. Limiting the Important Question Resolution in this way will permit the dual representation resolution to pass with a simple majority. Thus Peking will have been voted in. That puts the remaining issue, Taiwan's expulsion, in the sharpest and best possible form for us. So long as a simple majority supports the Modified Important Question Resolution, the expulsion can be prevented by only one-third of the UN membership. We can certainly hold one-third for the foreseeable future. The crunch question, therefore, is whether we can hold, in the years to come, a majority for a modified Important Question Resolution. If we can, we can save Taipei's membership. If we cannot, Taipei will be expelled.

Armed with this as the alternative policy, I suggest your representative should make the following points to Chiang:

- 1. Your concern in this matter is to prevent Taipei's expulsion from the United Nations. It is to discuss that danger, and how to meet it, that you have sent a personal representative.
- 2. If we stick to the current policy, we cannot prevent Taipei's expulsion -- probably this year, certainly next.



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
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- 3. The only new policy we can see which has a real chance of permanently preventing Taipei's expulsion is the mix of universality, dual representation, and a modified Important Question Resolution. We are not sure if that policy will work and cannot know without consulting widely with other UN members.
- 4. You are prepared to make a major international effort on behalf of this policy if Chiang wishes you to do so, and will help. A new policy, however, is not practical internationally or in U.S. domestic terms, unless it has Chiang's support.
- 5. You recognize that a new policy is difficult for him as well as us. You are prepared to lessen his problems by (a) reaffirmation of our Defense Treaty, (b) assurances on the maintenance of U.S. force levels on Taiwan, and (c) sympathetic consideration of his military assistance needs.
- 6. Under these circumstances, which course does he prefer: staying with current policy, or trying to line up support for the new policy?

Presented in this stark way, I think there is at least a chance that Chiang will opt for a change of policy. He has not survived all his troubles by giving in to an impulse for suicide. However, his domestic considerations may lead him nonetheless to prefer expulsion to compromise.

Whatever Chiang's preference, there is a compelling reason to consult very candidly with him on this issue before you make up your mind. Otherwise, a decision to stick with the current policy is singularly subject to misunderstanding. After all, the practical effect of such a policy is Taiwan's expulsion, and everyone knows that including Chiang's officials, foreign governments, and the U.S. press. Unless there has been a clear understanding with Chiang on it, many people, both at home and abroad, will seriously question the real motive behind a U.S. policy which can only result in Taiwan's expulsion.

(See recommendations next page



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RECOMMENDATIONS:

1,	That you approve Robert Murphy as your personal representative to
•	Chiang.
	ApproveDisapprove
2.	That he proceed to Taiwan as soon as possible to consult with Chiang
	along the lines set forth in this memo, with stress on obtaining Chiang's
	preferences between sticking to our current policy and shifting to a new
	policy of dual representation aimed at maintaining Taiwan's UN seat.
	Approve Disapprove
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3.	That your final decision on our policy and consultations with other govern-
	ments be deferred until we have Chiang's reactions.
	Approve Disapprove
4.	That pending those decisions, State be instructed carefully to avoid any
	indication of a new U.S. position on the Chirep issue.
	/ position on the Officep issue.
	Approve / //// Disapprove
	Approve Disapprove
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