The Korean Wave

Korean Media Go Global

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Youna Kim

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Chapter 1

Soft power and the Korean Wave

Joseph Nye and Youna Kim

Why South Korea should go soft

In a recent survey of G-20 nations published in *The Chosun Ilbo*, the Hansun Foundation ranked South Korea as 13th in the world in terms of national power, the ability to obtain what a country wants in international affairs. South Korea ranked 9th in hard power resources defined in terms of military and economic capabilities, but performed more poorly in soft power, ranking 12th. In the words of the paper:

> State of the art factories, high-tech weapons, advanced information communications infrastructure are the key components that a country must have for a stronger international competitiveness. However, for these "hard power" ingredients to become true engines to propel the country's growth and prosperity, they must be backed by more sophisticated and highly efficient "soft power" that runs the hardware. Unfortunately, South Korea is relatively weak in soft power.

The "Wisemen Roundtable on Soft Power in Northeast Asia" convened by the Korea Foundation, the East Asia Institute and *Joongang Ilbo* in February 2008 reached a similar conclusion. In short, South Korea needs to pay more attention to soft power if it is to play a larger role and command more attention in international affairs.

Power is the ability to make others act in a way that advances the outcomes you want. One can affect behavior in three main ways: threats of coercion ("sticks"), inducements or payments ("carrots") and attraction that makes others want what you want ("soft power"). Soft power co-opts people rather than coerces them: If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what I want. Soft power is not the same as influence, though it is one source of it. Influence can also rest on the hard power of threats or payments. And soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to entice and attract (Nye 2004).

In behavioral terms, soft power is attractive power. In terms of resources, soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction. Some resources can produce both hard and soft power. For example, a strong economy can produce carrots for paying others, as well as a model of success that attracts others. In international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets and in the way it deals with others. It was a former French foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine (1997–2002), who observed that America is powerful because it can inspire the dreams and desires of others. The U.S. is master of global images through film and television; this, in part, draws large numbers of overseas students, who either stay or bring their experience back home with them.

The soft power of any country rests primarily on three resources: (1) the attractiveness of its culture, (2) its political values, when it lives up to them at home and abroad, and (3) its foreign policies, when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority. Sometimes, these dimensions can conflict with each other. For example, the attractiveness of the United States declined markedly after the invasion of Iraq, which was seen as illegitimate in the eyes of many nations. In contrast, after the United States used its navy to assist in Tsunami relief in 2005, polls showed an impressive increase in its standing in Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world. In China, former President Hu Jintao told the 17th party congress that China needed to invest more in soft power to increase its standing in the world, and Chinese soft power benefited from the successful staging of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, but recent polls show that China's human rights policies and censorship of free speech has limited the growth of its soft power.

A soft power strategy for South Korea

South Korea, with its population of about 50 million people, is not big enough to be one of the world's great powers. But many small and medium-sized countries wield outsized influence because of their adept use of soft power. Canada, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian states, for example, have political clout that is greater than their military and economic weight, because they have incorporated attractive causes such as economic aid or peacemaking into their definitions of their national interest. South Korea should seek to follow these examples.

Seoul has impressive potential for soft power. In addition to its stunning economic success, it has developed a truly democratic political system, characterized by human rights, free elections and the transfer of power between different political parties. Of course, South Korean democracy is not exactly tidy; bribery scandals are all too common and parliamentary fistfights are not unknown. Even so, the fact that Korea fights it out, sometimes literally, in the open is a point in its favor.

Finally, there is the attractiveness of South Korean culture. The traditions of Korean art, crafts and cuisine have already spread around the world. The impressive success of the Korean diaspora in the United States has enhanced the attractiveness of the culture and country from which they came. Many Korean-Americans have risen to important positions, and this has created a positive view about their country of origin. Korean popular culture has proved attractive across borders, in particular among younger people in neighboring Asian countries and beyond.

What can Korea do?

1 Attracting more foreign students to South Korean universities would be one way to reinforce the country's role in this transnational youth culture. This would involve more emphasis on English as well as Korean language instruction, as well as scholarships for students from other countries.
2 Korea can increase its overseas development assistance to raise its profile on other continents besides Asia. Many African countries that are seeing increases in Chinese aid but worry about Chinese domination, would welcome the diversification that Korean aid could provide.
3 Korea could sponsor more exhibits, visiting speakers and broadcasting to convey the story of Korea's success to other countries. In 1960, Korea and Ghana had the same per capita income. Today Korea is not only a member of the OECD, but has become a democratic success story. The Korean government can help convey this story, but its credibility would be enhanced if Korean companies, universities and non-profit organizations also conveyed the message.
4 Korea can host major international conferences and events that draw attention to its successes. The fact that the G-20 met in Seoul in 2010 is a good example, but an active program of sponsorship of non-governmental events would help as well. Topics like health, development and climate change are issues that would draw attention to Korea's efforts.

Korea has a message for the rest of the world, and it needs to see itself as more than a regional actor and think of the ways in which it can contribute to global public goods that are well received throughout the world. This will enhance Korea's standing and create an enabling environment for the pursuit of Korea's foreign policy interests. In short, South Korea has the resources to produce soft power, and its soft power is not prisoner to its geographical or demographic limitations.

Korean Wave popular culture as resources

Since its release in July 2012, Psy's music video *Gangnam Style* (1.5 billion views on YouTube, as of April 2013) has prompted more people around the world to seek information on South Korea, due to the sudden attractiveness

or sarcastic humor of an actor's culture. The emergence of Korean popular culture, as exemplified by Psy's *Gangnam Style*, is a ready-made export that is enhancing the country's soft power (British Council 2012; *Daily Mail* 2012; *Forbes* 2012). Under conditions of globalizing market forces in a digital age, *Gangnam Style* has become a "cool" cultural brand promoting Korean exports ranging from mobile phones to cosmetics to consumer electronics. The nation can be reinvented as a more favorable and lasting brand by the government's cultural policy that global circulations of media cultural products promote the construction of soft power, an attractive image of the nation as a whole.

Earlier in 2005, for the first time in the Middle East, Korean popular culture began spreading the non-economic side of its soft power to the political sphere, when the Korean TV drama *Winter Sonata* hit airwaves in Iraq (Kim 2007). The South Korean government (Defense Ministry) reported that the drama signed a broadcast agreement with Kurdistan Satellite Channel, a broadcaster operated by the Kurdistan government. The goal was to generate positive feelings in the Arab world towards the 3,200 South Korean soldiers stationed in northern Iraq. Originally, the Defense Ministry considered providing Korean movies in Iraq, but this was repealed due to concerns that a flock of moviegoers might lead to possible accidents or terrorist attacks. So the final decision was made to broadcast the TV drama *Winter Sonata* which had already proven popular worldwide. The drama was aired with Kurdish subtitles, every Thursday at 5:00 p.m. with reruns every 8 hours. Furthermore, the South Korean government purchased the rights to provide Korean TV dramas for free to broadcasting stations in more Arab countries in an effort to create a favorable image of the nation.

The South Korean government (Overseas Information Service) also gave the popular drama *Winter Sonata* to Egyptian television in 2004, paying for Arabic subtitles (Kim 2007). The broadcast was part of the government's efforts to improve the image of South Korea in the Middle East, where there is little understanding and exposure towards Korean culture. The state-run broadcaster ERTU (Egypt Radio Television Union) aired the drama daily except Fridays on its satellite channel. This led to thousands of fan letters to the Korean Embassy in Egypt, indicating a warm reception by Egyptian audiences. A flood of e-mails and phone calls were received at the Embassy when another Korean drama *Autumn in the Heart* was broadcast in 2004. Many of them called for inviting the leading actors of the drama to Egypt. One of the e-mails was from a professor at a University of Cairo saying that he had watched the drama every night with his wife and two children. A female fan asked the Embassy to broadcast the drama again and to introduce more Korean dramas. Egyptian viewers have launched a Korean drama fan club and website, expressing a newly found interest on the Internet: "I wish I could visit Korea some day" (an Egyptian fan, quoted in *KBS Global Marketing* 2005). The expression of these thoughts indicates that the Korean Wave popular drama is understood in the Arabic cultural sphere. Now, the Korean

Wave popular culture helps young people in the Middle East to raise interest in Korean studies and the Korean language (Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism 2013).

These cases signify the Korean Wave popular culture's potentiality as soft power resources that may have a significant and complex impact on cultural diplomacy as well as on trade, tourism, the academy and other national interests across various contexts. Popular culture has become a potentially important resource for soft power diplomacy, transcultural collaborations, dialogues and struggles to win hearts and minds of people. Such a potentiality is evident in the region of East Asia which is still haunted by colonization and violence (Chua 2012). Culture – particularly, popular, media and consumer culture – transcends borders with such frequency and intensity as to constitute an irrevocable and irresistible force that regionalizes and possibly transforms identity (Berry *et al.* 2009). It is this power that governments seek to promote through the articulation and legislation of cultural policy and the promotion of cultural industries, with a renewed focus on identity, culture and nation branding as an essential component of foreign policy thinking.

South Korea is now among the world's 13 largest economies but still does not have its own unique brand or unique cultural identity, partly because for the past 50 years it has focused on building the country, not marketing it (BBC News 2012). The G-20 summit held in Seoul in 2010 increased awareness of South Korea by almost 17%, making it one of the country's most successful marketing events. In Europe, people still associate South Korea mainly with the Korean War or North Korea, sometimes with mobile phones or cars, more than with its culture. South Korea brings its culture to Paris with "Korea Week," an event which aims to enhance the country's international standing and change the image of its economic hard power far outweighing its soft power in the eyes of the global community (*France 24* 2011).

The South Korean government, along with the private sector and the academy, has been working on the recreation of its national image and cultural identity for multiple effects of soft power by integrating the Korean Wave popular culture since the late 1990s. The Kim Young Sam government (1993–98) and the official globalization policy (*segyehwa*) started to respond to neoliberalism and regulatory practices imposed by the U.S. and other Western countries. In 1999, the Kim Dae Jung government (1998–2003) provided the financial support of $148.5 million to the culture industry. Focusing on the so-called three Cs – Content, Creativity and Culture – the government encouraged colleges to open culture industry departments, providing equipment and scholarships. The number of such departments rose from almost none to more than 300 by 2004.

The Roh Moo Hyun government (2003–8) advocated "cultural diversity" and vitality as well as creativity. The Lee Myung Bak government (2008–13) sought to promote "Brand Korea" to enhance the nation's image and soft power through popular culture in a wide range of areas from K-pop music to

Korean food. Various organizations including the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST) and the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) set aside budget for programs to promote the national image. To a great extent, the global circulation of Korean popular culture for the creation of soft power is the consequence of Korean national policies.

The Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Sports has been intensely promoting Korea through "Visit Korea" campaigns with the marketing slogan "Korea, Sparkling" and the official tourism website (Korea Sparkling) that provides information about popular TV dramas and movies including storylines, filming locations and leading actors and actresses. The government has also appointed the Korean Wave stars as tourism ambassadors, while hosting events for overseas fan clubs of the Korean Wave. For instance, fans of *Jewel in the Palace* can visit the historical drama's shooting site, Jeju Folk Village, and experience traditional culture such as *hanbok* (traditional clothes), *hanok* (traditional house) and *hansik* (traditional food).

Scenery, as a marker of foreignness, constitutes a mode of visual tourism. Avid fans of Korean TV dramas can become so enamored by the sceneries that the locations become "must see" places and storytelling of the mobile self (Kim 2007 and 2011). "You know, there's this scene where they went up by cable car and got caught in a snowstorm? We went up, too. I even went to the restaurant where the two of them sat" (a Singaporean fan of *Winter Sonata*, quoted in *Straits Times* 2003). As picturesque romance dramas like *Winter Sonata* and *Autumn in the Heart* have dominated TV screens, the snow slope and the beach where the memorable scenes were filmed have become a popular destination for overseas fans.

About 11 million foreign tourists visited Korea in 2012 (Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism 2013). In past decades, Korean TV stations and drama producers were often accused of putting too much focus on dramas and unrealistic escapism at the expense of more educational programming, but now they are honored for bringing home foreign currency. Furthermore, the engagement with the Korean drama *Winter Sonata* has created a new awareness among the Japanese, and the number of private language schools that teach Korean has increased in Japan: "Watching the drama, I just wished I could understand what he was saying in Korean" (a female fan, quoted in *Yomiuri Shimbun* 2004). Language learning is often about a desire to reinvent oneself in transnational spaces and that desire is crucially influenced by media discourses (Piller and Takahashi 2010).

More than 100,000 international students come to Korea each year, and about 41% of American fans of the Korean Wave popular culture are learning the Korean language (*Yonhap News* 2013). A recent survey in Singapore, for example, shows that the initial motivation for many university students to learn the Korean language is "to gain greater exposure to the Korean Wave popular culture" (Chan and Chi 2011). In Singapore, there is some demand for Korean studies and Korean language instruction, driven by both

economics and the Korean Wave, although these demands are small in scale and are being satisfied outside the schools and tertiary institutions (Steinberg 2010). This also implies that such a motivation and demand may prove to be a transient interest which may wane once the hype trend generated by the Korean Wave has subsided.

In a digital age, South Korea can appropriate this opportunity to make its language, culture and society more attractive to wider international audiences and open possibilities for soft power of the Korean Wave popular culture. Today's rapid media globalization and the widespread use of information and communication technologies present new opportunities as well as unprecedented challenges to nation-states. Information is power, and modern information technology is spreading information more widely than ever before in history, which adds the reasons why soft power is becoming more important than in the past (Nye 2004).

The Korean Wave is finally making its way into isolated North Korea despite tight controls set by the regime's authority (Kim 2007 and 2011). In recent years, cases of defections have continued to occur, while the means of access to the Korean Wave popular culture has expanded through the use of the Internet and cellular phones in North Korea (*Daily NK* 2011b). North Koreans caught watching the South Korean media face up to two years in a labor re-education camp, or up to five years in a prison camp for more serious cases.

The 33 North Korean defectors interviewed in a recent study revealed that they had illegally consumed the South Korean media "every day" (34%) or "once or twice a month" (41%) before they fled to the South (*Daily NK* 2011c). "Listening to South Korean songs just makes me feel good. I hum a song without realizing it. Our songs are all about political ideas" (a North Korean defector, quoted in *Daily NK* 2011c). North Korean young people dance to South Korean music (K-pop), sometimes with the lyrics erased, because they want to dance freely and the lyric-less songs would not compel the regime's authority (Young Red Guards) to stop their dance (*Daily NK* 2011a).

These illegal activities may be part of the process of imagining about, and reflecting on, social transformation and other structures of identity, while attempting liberation of desire from established structures. The Korean Wave popular culture in North Korea may provide a new framework for making sense of the world, with a possibility of a multitude of meanings to emerge and circulate in everyday life (Kim 2007 and 2011). Despite the higher risk of execution for consuming the South Korean popular culture, many North Koreans get a taste of freedom, modernity and the free-market fantasies spun by the illegal, smuggled dramas and movies, and now through the Internet.

Driven by globalization and interdependence, Korean Wave popular culture is building a bridge between cultural connectivity and South Korea's strongest form of soft power – the attraction and acquiescence of people without the

use of military or economic force. However, given the nature of soft power being uncontrollable and unpredictable, as being shaped by many complex factors including the geopolitics and strategic interests of nations (Fan 2008), the Korean Wave soft power may play a limited role, albeit significant historically.

Korean Wave soft power and its limits

Soft power has been an extremely productive concept but also remains an elusive concept partly because its measurement is a formidable challenge. It is not sufficiently clear how soft power actually works in specific international relationships, and using poll data as an empirical ground of soft power requires much caution, calling for qualitative and ethnographic methods of measuring it (Lee and Melissen 2011). To some extent, Korean Wave popular culture has heightened South Korea's visibility around the world and captured the imagination of a new generation. It has possibly changed foreign perceptions of South Korea, which predominantly has been viewed as an industrial powerhouse and whose achievements have been overshadowed by North Korea, or often ignored at the expense of more attention being paid to the neighboring countries, China and Japan.

Thanks to the Korean Wave popular culture, the awareness and image of South Korea have perhaps changed in the popular mind abroad, for example in Southeast Asia since 2005. Yet, that awareness does not necessarily translate into "better policy" either by or towards South Korea (Steinberg 2010). It is remarkable that leading intellectuals and policy-makers in Southeast Asia, Europe or elsewhere may find it extremely difficult to identify nationals in their own countries who can be considered specialists or knowledgeable about Korea in any depth. The European public remain largely unaware of Korean culture including traditional arts, even though K-pop music has successfully entered the continent since 2011.

Does South Korea want to be remembered and identified overseas mainly by its pop culture? The recent success of Psy and K-pop idol groups has created a cool national image, soft power, in raising its international stature. Yet at the same time, this can create a very partial and distorted picture of South Korea now associated with "a pudgy comic singer and long-legged beauties" (*Korea Times* 2012). A country's image, as a source of soft power, can be both very powerful and very constraining. The global audiences may expect certain conformity with the very partial, or extremely polished, image in the popular cultural forms of K-pop music, dramas and films, without further developing an ability to understand the country's actual conditions and socio-political issues.

The concept of soft power has also been used to represent the power of Japanese popular culture overseas, also known as "Japanese cool." It may well be desirable for the sort of cultural content embodied in "Japanese cool," such as manga, anime or fashion, to spread naturally around the world through global market forces or people's efforts. Yet, this will not necessarily lead to an increase in understanding of Japan in any depth (Ogoura 2006). Those on the receiving end of contemporary cultural activities either from or related to Japan are not necessarily aware of any Japanese connection and actual conditions there.

The relatively happy, fun, trouble-free, cosmopolitan consumption of popular cultural forms, or the consumers' "hearts and minds," do not always lead to any in-depth understanding of the history, culture and society within which the popular cultural forms are embedded and produced. What is consumed here are meanings and symbolic values which are not used up through the production of culture as commodity, but which continue to circulate in ever increasing and expanding circuits of communication in the emergence of the cultural economy in a new digital age (Chua 2012).

The Korean Wave, with the active role of the nation-state, is a pronounced example of the crossover of culture and economy, and the commercialization of culture through nation branding, taking a neoliberal capitalist approach in the era of globalization. Recent policy discussions in Korea continue to utilize culture as transnational commodity and capital. The Korean Wave idols are often chosen as commodity representatives of Korean brands, helping Korean trademarks to become more fashionable, cool image products through constant product placement and idol promotion (Huang 2011). In the widest possible sense, the Korean culture industry is seen to commodify the nation, exporting its popular culture as a cool national brand.

This dependency on the Korean Wave popular culture to create soft power and develop new markets, such as South America, Southeast Asia and the Middle East, is particularly significant at a time when the world economy shows signs of slowing down (Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency 2013). Korea's soft power is likely to be an extension of its economic influence, which is a core component of hard power. With their accustomed nationalism, East Asian countries would like to invest in soft power to expand their existing economic influence and acquire more sophisticated politico-cultural leverage (Lee and Melissen 2011). Popular culture has emerged as a core component of a nation's economic competitiveness which extends to interests in cultural influence and cultural diplomacy.

In cultural diplomacy, however, a greater emphasis should be placed on reciprocal cultural flows and mutual understandings, rather than asymmetrically presenting a nation's own culture, or cultural nationalism, based on the market-driven cultural economy. This unequal condition is most pronounced in East Asia. It has been overwhelmingly Korean and Japanese popular cultures such as TV dramas that enter Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and urban China, yet there is very little flow in the reverse direction (Chua 2012).

The Korean Wave, as a state-subsidized "soft power" initiative, has emerged as a new player for the production and circulation of transnational culture,

while consolidating a relatively more growing position in the regional market based on geopolitics and similar historical experiences. The postcolonial periphery is fast becoming a major center for the production of transnational culture, not just a sinkhole for its transnational consumption (Watson 1997). There is a lingering anti-colonial sentiment lurking in the hearts of people in many Asian countries; however, the Korean Wave appears to benefit from the sense of solidarity, sympathy more than resentment, which people have towards the country that shared a similar colonial past and continues to struggle in a current postcolonial situation.

Korea with the sentiment of "*han*" (deep suffering) is seen to be a less problematic source of power and ideological threat than some other countries in Asia, for example "Japanese odour" (Iwabuchi 2002) that Japanese cultural producers try to remove from their products in order not to induce resistance from regional audiences. On the other hand, the aspirations behind the national government's efforts to use popular culture, and the impact of the asymmetrical cultural flows, are limited by the fragmented nature of global audiences who respond differently, by the audience reception as a contested site of negotiation, and even by the possibility of resistance and subversion. This limitation is evident in anti-Korean Wave movements in Japan, Taiwan, China, Singapore, Thailand and so on. It is usually confronted with larger non-consumer communities reinforcing nationalist discourses with the complicity of local media productions and the state (Chua 2008).

For instance, Japanese nationalist groups have held regular demonstrations against Fuji Television, demanding that the television company stop excessively broadcasting Korean TV dramas and other Korean entertainment (*JoongAng Daily* 2011). In Taiwan, too, Korean dramas have faced negative sentiments for the excessive airing of Korean shows in the evening time, between 6:00 p. m. and midnight. In 2010, Taiwanese TV stations aired 162 Korean dramas, or an average of 13 Korean dramas per month (*Dong-A Ilbo* 2012). Initially, Korean dramas were considered as cheap alternatives to their Japanese counterparts. In 2000, at the early stage of the Korean Wave, Taiwan's Gala TV paid $1,000 for one hour of a Korean drama, compared with $15,000 to $20,000 for a Japanese one. After only five years, however, a Korean drama commanded $7,000 to $15,000, and a Japanese one $6,000 to $12,000 (*New York Times* 2005).

The heightened visibility of Korean popular culture has been criticized by the mass media and the public overseas as a cultural invasion of the Korean Wave. Regionalism may be a response or a challenge to globalization, but also one component of globalization that is a complex, conflicting and indeterminate process (Berry *et al.* 2009). While the Korean Wave fosters connectivity within East Asian cultural geography, the diversity of its fandom also demonstrates that the cultural identity of East Asia is neither monolithic nor reified, but envisaged as a variable and asymmetric space of both integration and contestation (Cho 2011).

Linking culture to the nation-state carries a high risk of impeding, rather than promoting, the spread of cultural activities around the world (Ogoura 2006). With the active involvement of the government, the Korean Wave has been largely constructed within nationalistic discourses and policies, and imagined with cultural nationalism – a form of hegemony masked in soft power. Nationalism has been central to the globalization of media cultural products; paradoxically, the question of how global such media are is to ask how nationalistic they are (Chan 2005). This Korean version of nationalistic and expansionistic cultural policy has a tendency to develop into another form of hegemonic cultural imperialism in the region. The Korean Wave popular culture, as resources for soft power for the postcolonial periphery, can ironically generate a new version of cultural imperialism that is deeply embedded in cultural nationalism and its ideological position going against cultural diversity and soft power of attraction.

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Chapter 2

Korean Wave and inter-Asian referencing

Koichi Iwabuchi

East Asia has become a key location in which new digital media such as mobile phones, digital video games, and the Internet discussion site and social networking service flourish among the youth. Production capacity of media cultures such as TV, films and popular music has also been considerably developed. Many researches have examined the distinctive features of East Asian media cultures in terms of the modes of textuality, production and consumption. Among them, Korean media cultures currently sweep over Asian markets. Films, TV dramas and K-pop – various media cultures have been trend-setting in East Asia and accordingly many researches have been conducted about the Korean Wave. In this chapter, I will consider the significance of studying the Korean Wave by putting it in a wider framework of the studies of East Asian media culture connections. Following the recent call for the advancement of inter-Asian referencing and the establishment of East Asian media culture studies (Chua 2010 and 2011; Cho 2011), I will consider how the comparison of the Korean Wave with other counterparts such as Japanese media culture would elucidate what is emergent, residual and dominant about some key issues such as translocal hybridization processes and non-Western articulation of cultural modernities. Such investigation will highlight the possibility of de-Westernized production of knowledge and, no less importantly, urge us to keep on questioning seriously whether and how East Asia as a cultural geography matters. It will also be suggested that the pursuit of the potential of inter-Asian referencing to the full requires making inter-Asian referencing not just a matter of academic research but also of the advancement of people's cross-border dialogue as mundane practice.

Inter-Asian referencing and the studies of East Asian pop culture

Long-standing advocacy of de-Westernizing academic production of knowledge has entered a new stage as the drastic development of the