

Political Culture and Regime Support in Asia

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The authoritarian Chinese regime enjoys one of the highest levels of popular support in Asia, higher than that enjoyed by many democratic regimes in the region. This finding comes from the East Asia Barometer (EAB) surveys, and it raises a number of follow-on questions. Why does the Chinese regime enjoy strong popular legitimacy, and why do most of the democratic regimes in the region have weaker support in comparison? What do the differing levels of support tell us about the dynamics of state-society relations in different types of regimes, and about the stability of such regimes? Using the EAB data to address these questions, this paper focuses in particular on the role of political culture in helping to shape regime support. In the process, the paper addresses some issues of general theoretical interest about political culture, including how to measure it and how to assess its influence on some aspects of political behavior and attitudes.

The East Asia Barometer. The East Asia Barometer (EAB) was a comparative study of popular attitudes toward politics in Asia conducted by means of national random-sample surveys in eight Asian societies in 2001-2003. The project was coordinated by Yun-han Chu, funded in large part by the Taiwan Ministry of Education, and headquartered at National Taiwan University. I was on the project’s steering committee and served as co-editor of the book which reports the main findings.¹ The EAB subsequently expanded into a regional survey network under the title Asian Barometer Survey (ABS), which continues to be coordinated by Professor Chu and which has been conducting second-wave surveys patterned after the first round, in the original eight countries plus an additional ten. This paper is based on the first-round (EAB) surveys, but I plan subsequently to expand the analysis to incorporate data from the second wave.

The EAB employed standardized survey instruments designed around a common research framework. The participating country teams and an international steering committee designed the questionnaire.² The political systems involved were Japan (sample size 1,418), Taiwan (1,415), the Philippines (1,200), South Korea (1,500), Thailand (1,546), Mongolia (1,144), Hong Kong (811), and China (3,183). Summing the eight samples, the project’s dataset contains information from a total of 12,218 respondents.

¹ Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, and Doh Chull Shin, eds., *How East Asians View Democracy*, under submission.

² For further information see www.asianbarometer.org.

Within each of the eight societies the local research team conducted a country-wide national random sample survey (see Appendix for details). The sampling method varied from country to country depending on local conditions. The questionnaire was administered in face to face interviews conducted by college and/or graduate students, institute researchers, retired middle school teachers, or professional survey interviewers. The questionnaire contained about 150 items (questions), and required about one hour to complete.

The main questions that the research project tried to address were inspired by the concept of democratic consolidation.³ Five of our eight countries were new democracies (Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Mongolia). One was an established democracy (Japan), one a partial democracy (Hong Kong), and one an authoritarian system (China). Democratic consolidation is defined as occurring when a democratic regime has become “the only game in town,” so that a return to authoritarianism is unthinkable. The project asked to what extent democracy was consolidated attitudinally in the five new democracies and used data from the other three systems to provide comparative context.

Public support for democracy and lack of support for authoritarian alternatives are among the key factors for democratic consolidation. To be sure, the public’s commitment to democracy is not the only requirement for consolidation: democracy can be reversed even if the public prefers it. (This happened in 2006 to one of the new democracies in our study, Thailand, where, as we will see below, the public was highly supportive of democracy.) But if the public is not committed, then an important bulwark against democratic reversal is missing.⁴ The EAB surveys thus chose to assess the strength of the public’s attitudinal commitment to democracy and the strength of its rejection of authoritarian alternatives in the eight societies that we studied. We also wanted to know what sociodemographic and attitudinal variables affected the level of the public’s pro-democracy and anti-authoritarian attitudes.

Although the project focused on attitudes toward democracy, it also asked questions which permit a variety of additional lines of investigation, including the puzzle I am interested in here about the determinants of public support for regimes. The questionnaires collected the following sets of variables from each respondent:

- Individual attributes: Socio-demographic variables (sex, education, income, urban and rural residence, and so forth); Social capital (the respondent’s involvement in social organizations, NGOs, personal networks, etc.); Psychological involvement in politics (how interested the respondent says he/she is in politics, how much attention a person pays to politics); Perceived citizen efficacy and system responsiveness (the citizen’s perception of him- or herself as being able to understand politics and have some influence, the citizen’s perception of the political system’s responsiveness to citizen inputs); Partisanship (that is, loyalty to any specific political party); Policy priorities.
- Media participation and political knowledge.

³ This concept is defined and discussed in Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

⁴ The role that mass public attitudes play in democratic consolidation is discussed in Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, and Andrew J. Nathan, “Conclusion: Values, Regime Performance, and Democratic Consolidation,” in *How East Asians View Democracy*, cited above.

- Political behavior: Participation in elections; Electoral mobilization (participation in election campaigns, like attending meetings or asking other people to attend meetings); Other political participation.

- Political attitudes: Respondent's understanding of what the word democracy means; Respondent's opinion about the desirability, suitability and other good/bad characteristics of democracy; Respondent's satisfaction with and support of the current regime; Respondent's acceptance or rejection of authoritarian alternatives; Evaluations of past, present, and possible future regimes' levels of democracy; Regime performance evaluations; Perceived and observed corruption; Trust in institutions;

- Political culture: Traditional social values; Democratic values; Beliefs in procedural norms of democracy.

Although the project focused on regime type as the chief axis of comparison, other comparative dimensions are also built into the project's design, and will be used in some of the arguments I make in this paper. One can make comparisons among three Chinese societies that have different regime types and different modernization levels. One can compare the three Chinese societies with the five non-Chinese societies, the five societies with Confucian backgrounds (China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Japan) to one another and to the three non-Confucian societies, the more- developed countries with the less-developed countries, and so on. Or, breaking away from countries as units, one can compare attitudes or behaviors across different sociodemographic groups (educational strata, the two genders, and occupational, ethnic, religious, and other groupings) within or across societies.

The puzzle: levels of regime support and political culture. This paper focus on the question of how two key political-cultural attributes (traditional social values and democratic values) interact with perceived regime performance to affect respondents' support for their country's current regime.

Regime support as I am using it here is a concept grounded in David Easton's distinctions among political community, regime, and authorities, and between specific and diffuse support. Standing between the community – the state or nation – and the incumbent authorities, the regime is the system of political institutions. Diffuse support, Easton said, “refers to evaluations of what an object is or represents – to the general meaning it has for a person – not of what it does. ... Outputs and beneficial performance may rise and fall while this support, in the form of a generalized attachment, continues.”⁵ Diffuse regime support is thus synonymous with what we usually mean by political legitimacy, when that term is used in its behavioral or empirical rather than normative sense.⁶

Four bodies of theory offer hypotheses about causal chains that might affect the public's diffuse support for its regime. First, modernization theory suggests that socio-demographic changes in the population (urbanization, rising education levels, rising income levels) may render citizens more aware and critical of government; this in turn can affect legitimacy in different ways depending on regime type and performance.

⁵ David Easton, “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” *British Journal of Political Science* 5:4 (October 1975), p. 444.

⁶ Normative legitimacy is the rightness of the regime's claim to rule. Behavioral or empirical legitimacy is the level of the relevant public's diffuse support for the regime.

Second, communications theory suggests that access to and the contents of media can affect regime legitimacy positively or negatively, given a particular regime type and regime performance, depending on what kinds of messages the media convey. Third, public opinion studies suggest that perceived government performance affects legitimacy; regimes that deliver on issues that the public considers important gain support, and those that don't lose support. Finally, political culture theory suggests that deeply-rooted attitudes about authority will affect citizen's acceptance of different kinds of regimes.

These causal paths are complex and interacting, and we should not expect to find a formula that predicts regime legitimacy in a straightforward way from a simple suite of variables. But we can use the EAB project's comparative structure to throw light on how the four different causal chains interact in a variety of concrete national-historical circumstances.⁷ My interest here is in political culture in particular. Within the complex, contending processes that affect regime legitimacy, does culture – deeper, slower-changing public values and attitudes – have an effect of its own?

The puzzle is framed by Table 1, which displays the findings for seven variables and scales from the EAB that are relevant to our understanding of regime support in Asia. The table includes seven different variables because diffuse regime support is a difficult concept to measure. It is separate from public support for, or the popularity of, specific policies or specific incumbents. It is intrinsically multidimensional and in principle cannot be captured by a single questionnaire item. And the field so far lacks an established, accepted measure or set of measures of this concept.⁸ The EAB's attempt to measure this variable should thus be regarded as experimental. While the first two variables in Table 1 come closest to measuring the concept of diffuse regime support, the others have reference value and will remain within our scope of analysis in this paper.

(Table 1 about here)

The first item represents the concept of diffuse support most straightforwardly by asking respondents to agree or disagree with the proposition, "Whatever its faults may be, our form of government is still the best for us." The second item mentions "democracy." But since all the regimes that we surveyed claim to be democracies, I treat the question as revealing a diffuse attitude toward the existing regime, even in China and Hong Kong which have regimes whose claims to be democratic are generally not accepted by outside observers.

The next two items assess support for the regime in its specific character as a (self-claimed) democratic regime. The first is a scale derived by asking respondents to agree or disagree with four proposals to replace current institutions with, respectively, strongman rule, military rule, technocratic rule, or one-party rule. We can argue that the respondent who rejects such alternatives is displaying an aspect of diffuse support for the current regime. (Only two of these questions were asked in China, about military rule and technocratic rule, since China already in effect has strongman rule and one-party rule.) The second scale, commitment to democracy, is derived from a series of questions

⁷ This paper doesn't explore the impact of media, but the EAB dataset has variables that will make it possible to do so.

⁸ Bruce Gilley, "The meaning and measure of state legitimacy: Results for 72 countries," *European Journal of Political Research* 45 (2006), pp. 499-525.

probing the respondent's support for democracy in five dimensions (whether it is desirable for one's country, suitable for the country, capable of solving the country's problems, preferable to other forms of government, and equally or more important than economic development). If the respondent agreed with three or more of these items he is coded as committed to democracy. For present purposes I treat this scale as assessing an aspect of diffuse regime support in places where the regime claims to be democratic (which include all eight EAB political systems).

The last three questions are indirectly related to regime support, but are useful comparison points for our inquiry. "Satisfied with the current government" expresses support for the incumbents and policies rather than the regime; trust in government institutions focuses on specific institutions (the courts, the central government, parliament, the military, and local government) and asks about trust, which is presumably a component of support; "expects democratic progress" is a measure of optimism about the trend of events in the regime over the next five years.

The table is arranged so that the country with the highest average level of positive responses on all these questions (Thailand) is located on the left and the country with the lowest level (Japan) is on the right. (The average itself has no strict meaning but is a convenient way to order the countries for a first impression of the data.) Cell percentages that are at or above the row average are in boldface (red) while those below the average are in nonbold (green). (The row average has no substantive meaning but simply provides the cutoff point for these typographical cues.)

The table shows that China has the highest percentage of citizens in the region who say "our form of government is the best for us" (94.4%), and the second highest who are "satisfied with how democracy works in our country" (81.7%). By contrast, the oldest established democracy in the region, Japan, has the lowest percentage on both measures. These results are – or at least they should be – surprising, since democratic theory teaches us that regimes that are accountable enjoy greater legitimacy.

In fact, the findings may seem so surprising to some readers that they will ask whether the data are correct. This is always a good question to ask with survey research. I do not have space fully to answer it here. To answer it, one might first explore whether the samples and interview procedures were valid; the best way to assess that (besides reading the appendix) would be to look at the performance of the dataset as a whole in a series of analyses, including those in this paper and in other publications, to see whether the data make sense across a wide range of findings. The second question might be whether the questionnaire item being analyzed was well framed or whether it misled respondents; to alleviate this worry, I have presented a variety of items and scales so that we can compare their performance, a comparison which shows that the Chinese regime enjoys rather high support and the Japanese regime rather low support, comparatively speaking, on a variety of probes. The third question might be whether Chinese respondents were answering truthfully; my colleague Tianjian Shi has addressed that question in the affirmative in a variety of publications⁹ (the question presumably does not arise for Japanese respondents or those in the other six political systems). The final

⁹ See the China chapter by Shi in *How East Asians View Democracy*; also Shi, "Survey Research in China," in Michael X. Delli Carpini, Huddy Leonie, and Robert Y. Shapiro, eds., *Research in Micropolitics* (Greenwich, Conn.: JAL Press, 1996), pp. 213-250, and Shi, *Political Participation in Beijing* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).

question might be whether my coding, scaling, and statistical procedures are correct, which can best be answered by looking at my SPSS syntax; but here again, the similarity of findings across a range of variables tends to suggest that the findings are broadly robust even if some of them are found to involve questionable coding decisions. Also, the EAB findings on regime support in China are consistent with those of some other survey researchers who have worked in China independently of us.¹⁰

Table 1 contains a lot of other interesting information about the differences along both columns and rows to which I cannot devote space in this paper. I will comment on just one. We see that Japan leads all the other systems in its rejection of authoritarian alternatives; while they are critical of their democracy, they are not anxious to jump to another kind of system, suggesting what Larry Diamond calls “the Churchillian definition” of consolidation as the acceptance of democracy as the worst alternative except for all the rest. Not only is this probably a more realistic portrayal of the state of mind of most democratic publics than the romantic vision that democratic publics love their regimes, but it also suggests why authoritarian rejection may be an important dimension to look at when we try to measure diffuse support in regimes that claim to be democratic.

Without stopping to analyze the findings for other countries, let us push ahead toward the central question. What causes high legitimacy in China and low legitimacy in Japan, and in such other political systems as Taiwan?

Performance versus culture as determinants of legitimacy. One possible set of causes of high or low regime support are citizens’ perceptions of the regime’s policy performance. The hypothesis would be that regimes gain support when they deliver for citizens and lose support when they do not.¹¹ To test this relationship, the EAB measured respondents’ perceptions of the current regime’s policy performance in each country by asking them to compare it to the preceding regime with respect to how well it delivered in each of nine policy domains. (The previous regime is the old authoritarian regime in the five new democracies, the pre-1945 regime in Japan, the pre-1979 regime in China, and the pre-1997 regime in Hong Kong.) The nine domains were as follows (divided for convenience into two categories): freedom of speech, freedom of association, equal treatment of citizens by government, providing citizens with popular influence over government, and providing an independent judiciary (these five are classified under the rubric “democratic performance” in Table 2); and working against corruption, providing law and order, providing economic development, and providing economic equality (classified under the heading “policy performance”).¹² Citizens were asked to rate the current regime’s performance in each domain on a 5-point scale, ranging from “much better than before” (+2) to “much worse than before” (-2).

I have space here to discuss only two summary measures of perceived performance. For each of the two clusters of policies, Table 2 gives the difference between the percentage of respondents in each country seeing improvement and the percentage seeing a decline in performance (the percentage differential index, or PDI).

¹⁰ Wenfang Tang, *Public Opinion and Political Change in China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); also works by Jie Chen, Lianjiang Li.

¹¹ To be added here: some literature review on this point.

¹² In Hong Kong, in the policy domain, only the anti-corruption question was asked.

The table is arranged so that the country with the highest level of perceived democratic performance comes first (Thailand) and the one with the lowest level comes last (Hong Kong).

(Table 2 about here)

We can interpret the table as showing that citizens throughout Asia had a realistic understanding of their government's performance. The citizens of the new democracies and of Japan all recognized that their current political systems provided greater freedom and accountability than did the old authoritarian systems. The citizens of Hong Kong considered that the new Special Autonomous Region (SAR) government, which is responsive to Beijing, did a worse job of protecting individual freedom and independence of the judiciary than the former British colonial government.

China ranks third in the region after Japan and Thailand in the preponderance of positive over negative evaluations of the direction of change in the regime's delivery of democratic goods. Although the Chinese regime remains authoritarian, Chinese believe that they are much freer now than they were under Mao. The PDI for individual items ranges from 82.1% for freedom of speech to 25.2% for popular influence.

Citizens throughout the region drew harsher judgments on their regimes' performance in the policy arena. At the time of the EAB survey many of the countries were experiencing problems of corruption (especially Japan, China, Mongolia, the Philippines, and Thailand), slow economic growth (Japan, Taiwan), and/or widening income gaps (China). These problems were reflected in citizens' ratings of their regimes' policy performance. In half of the countries there were more citizens giving negative than positive ratings to the current regime's policy performance compared to that of the old regime; and in three of the other four countries the positive ratings were anemic. Only in Thailand did a robust net plurality of citizens give positive ratings.¹³

Tables 1 and 2 together suggest – not surprisingly – that there is some relationship between perceived policy performance and diffuse regime support, although it is not ironclad. The order of countries in the two tables is almost the same. Given the highly aggregated nature of the statistics, the fact that Korea and the Philippines have changed places carries little meaning. The fact that Japan ranks number 8 in the first table and number 2 in the second reinforces the impression discussed earlier, that Japanese citizens hold the complex view that their regime is better than the alternatives yet disappointing.

Perceived regime performance goes part way to explain regime legitimacy, but cannot explain it entirely. Does political culture also play a role?

Operationalizing political culture: traditional social values. Political culture is usually defined in survey research as the distribution in a political system of values, attitudes, and beliefs about political objects.¹⁴ The concept covers a wide range of attitudes. For present purposes I am not interested in more changeable attitudes and evaluations (such as pro and con policy positions and approval ratings of incumbents) but

¹³ For country-by-country details on the ratings and the situations confronted by citizens see the country chapters in *How East Asians View Democracy*.

¹⁴ The definition comes from Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

in deeper norms and values that are learned relatively early in life, change relatively slowly, and which, I hypothesize, shape citizens' evaluations of the appropriateness of political regimes. The EAB survey measured two components of political culture: traditional social values and democratic values.

The traditional social values battery grew out of the work of H.C. Kuan and S.K. Lau in Hong Kong, who in turn based their research on qualitative studies of Asian values going back to Max Weber and including, more recently, the work of Lucian Pye.¹⁵ Kuan and Lau's questionnaire items were designed to measure beliefs in norms and values thought to have been prevalent in pre-modern societies in Asia, which have been replaced with alternative values at varying rates as Asia has modernized, but which still have identifiable support throughout the region, especially among older residents, lesser educated residents, rural residents, and females. Nine of Kuan and Lau's questionnaire items were adopted with the agreement of the other seven country teams for the EAB survey's social values battery.¹⁶ They are displayed in Table 3. In country-by-country factor analyses (not shown here) most of the items in most countries load onto two core values: seeking harmony while avoiding conflict, and respecting collective interests while submerging individual interests. The last two items in the table cluster less clearly with these two core factors in most countries.

(Table 3 about here)

The table is arranged so that the country with the lowest overall rate of agreement with the propositions – that is, the country with the (by this measure) least traditional, most modern, set of cultural values – is on the left (Hong Kong) while the country with the highest percentage of people agreeing with the set of traditionalist propositions is on the right (Mongolia). The order of countries reveals an Asia in which traditional values still have strong appeal, but where modernization seems to be creating rapid change (as far as one can tell from a synchronic dataset). The average rate of agreement with the nine traditionalist propositions ranges from 43.5% in highly modern, totally urban Hong Kong to 59.1% in mostly rural Mongolia, a spread of almost 16 percent. The more rural societies of Thailand and China are closer to Mongolia and the highly modernized societies of Taiwan and Japan are closer to Hong Kong.

In fact, the order of countries is roughly the reverse of that in the first two tables. Perhaps conflict-avoidant, community-oriented norms incline citizens to be deferential to their regimes, regardless of whether the regimes are democratic or authoritarian. By the same token, then, are citizens in societies where more modern values are prevalent more critical of their regimes and less likely to offer diffuse support, even if the regime is perceived as preferable to the alternatives and as performing well, as we saw was the case in Japan? This may be broadly the case, but we should not expect a simple answer to the puzzle of diffuse support. Japan, for example, is the wealthiest and most urbanized (except for Hong Kong) of the eight EAB countries, yet traditional values are approximately 5% more prevalent there than in Korea and are no different from the level found in the Philippines. So the relationships among the various attitudinal syndromes are not tight, nor should we expect them to be.

¹⁵ Cite Kuan and Lau.

¹⁶ One question was not asked in Korea.

China lies toward the right of the table. Although the country is urbanizing rapidly (its urban population is now over 50%), most of its urban residents came from the countryside and are not legal urban residents. So China's placement makes sense.¹⁷ Yet we should also notice that its average rate of agreement with the nine propositions is less than fifty percent. Rapid modernization is evidently undermining traditional attitudes.

The table is also arranged so that the top row displays the item that got the highest rate of agreement throughout the region (the individual should subordinate his interests to those of the family), while the last row shows the item that got the lowest level of agreement (a man should not work under a female supervisor), with the other items ranged between them. The range of values from most agreed to least agreed proposition is wide, opening a gap of over sixty percentage points.

A possible interpretation is that some of the propositions at the bottom of the table, especially the last one, are not really traditional Asian social values. There is an interesting discussion to be had about this, but to make it short for the purposes of this paper, one can test the appropriateness of these items by correlating agreement with other indicators that should indicate a person's traditional leanings, such as other traditional attitudes, age, sex, and education; by this standard, all nine items survive. Granted, however, to some extent that procedure is tautological, because it is based on the assumption that those who are elderly, female, and less-educated are more traditional-minded. Ultimately the better evidence for including the lowest-ranked (or any other) item in the scale has to be found in the literatures of anthropology, sociology, and intellectual history, because we do not have survey research going back far enough in time to adjudicate the point.

Alternatively, one may hypothesize that "social desirability effects" have depressed the rates of agreement with some of the items, particularly the third from last (hiring a relative) and the last (female supervisor): respondents in contemporary Asia know that views on these questions that used to be socially acceptable are disapproved of today, so they may not reveal their true opinions (especially, on the last item, to female interviewers¹⁸).

A third interpretation of the range of responses to the nine items is that different elements of an interlinked cultural syndrome change at different rates. The value of subordinating individual to family interests is apparently robust throughout the region, even in Hong Kong – which has the second highest percentage of respondents agreeing with this particular value, after China – perhaps in part because of its functional utility for running family-based enterprises. On the other hand, the desirability of a husband asking his wife to obey his mother is upheld only by minorities in all countries except China – perhaps because of the trend toward separate housing for parents and their married children.

Only the fourth item does not dip below 50% in any of the eight societies. The others all dip below that level in at least one society. One way to understand this is that all these values are ultimately vulnerable to losing majority status. Traditional social values should not be expected ever to disappear in Asia, any more than they have

¹⁷ Check Japan, China urban population data and source; also for the fact that they came from the countryside – can run that datum from our China dataset.

¹⁸ Unfortunately, data on the sex of the interviewer are incomplete in many of our datasets, making it impossible to test this conjecture.

elsewhere. If culturally appropriate similar questions were asked in the U.S., presumably some substantial fraction of people would agree with them. The right question to pose is whether some or all of the traditional values will diminish below some threshold, and whether they will do so in a socially differentiated way such that the more modern sectors of society believe in them less than the less modern sectors. The EAB's synchronic and comparative structure can tell us something about differential patterns of change among various traditional social values, but only diachronic data will allow us clearly to track patterns of change over time.

For present purposes it is enough to have established a measure of traditional social values. By summing each respondent's pro-traditional and anti-traditional responses to the nine items, we assign each respondent a score for the strength of his or her belief in traditional social values, which we use in the next step of analysis.

Operationalizing political culture: democratic values. First, however, we need to construct the second cultural scale, to measure democratic values. The scale is based on a battery in the EAB questionnaire that was developed, tested, and used over a series of surveys by a research team at National Taiwan University before being included in the EAB surveys. The battery asks respondents to agree or disagree with eight propositions. None of them uses the "d" word – democracy – so as to avoid triggering the socially desirable answer to the question (given that democracy is generally a praise word throughout the region). The agree answer is the democratic answer in some cases and the disagree answer is the democratic answer in other cases.¹⁹ The battery tests five core democratic values (political equality, political liberty, separation of powers, government accountability, and political pluralism). It does so with one question for each of the first two values and two questions for each of the next three.

Table 4, which displays the results, is organized similarly to Table 3. The item with the highest level of pro-democracy responses across the region (people with little education should have as much say) is in the first row and the item with the lowest level of pro-democracy responses (too many ways of thinking will make society chaotic) is in the bottom row. The country with the highest average level of pro-democracy responses (Japan) is in the left column and the country with the lowest level (Thailand) is in the right column.

(Table 4 about here)

The table displays the by-now familiar rough ordering of countries. The most traditional countries (Mongolia and Thailand) are also the ones with the least well established democratic values. The least traditional countries (Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan) constitute three of the four countries with the most strongly established democratic values.

The range of the national average level of belief in democratic values (over 35%) is more than twice as large as the range in national average traditionalism (15.6%), suggesting that if modernization is gradually homogenizing social values in the region it is not doing so equally rapidly with political values. The range, however, of average

¹⁹ It was not possible to design the same desirable feature of different response valences into the traditional social values battery because of the nature of the questions.

beliefs in the values themselves is smaller – a gap of over 60% between the most- and the least-accepted traditional social values compared to a gap of only 37.1% between the most- and least-accepted democratic values. This movement-in-tandem of democratic values was probably predetermined by the way the two batteries were conceptualized. The democratic values battery tests a set of norms that are inherently more tightly “constrained” – more logically related – than the wide-ranging set of values tapped by the traditional social values battery.²⁰

We saw in Tables 1 and 2 that the Thais showed the highest degree of enthusiasm for democracy of all the EAB countries. The information in Table 4 suggests that their enthusiasm was directed at the idea and the symbol rather than at the substance of democracy. The Thais are particularly out of step with the rest of the region in the low level of support they give to the principle of political equality. This probably reflects the sharp urban-rural gap, the monarchical system, and the tradition of a cleavage between the political elite and the masses.²¹ Japan is a somewhat opposite case. Table 4 shows it to be the country where substantive democratic values are most strongly established. Yet, as shown in Table 2, traditional values are also quite strong there.

China shows quite strong non-democratic values. The country’s pro-democracy average is elevated by the high level of agreement with the principle of political equality, which is rooted as much in China’s socialist tradition as in ideas of liberal or pluralist democracy.²² A majority of Chinese also believe that the legislature should play its role as a check on the administration. But when it comes to freedom of speech and tolerance for political disagreement, only a quarter to a little over a third of Chinese respondents give the pro-democratic answers.

The Chinese and Thai data underscore the importance of separating the assessment of democratic values from the word democracy. The “d” word elicits high levels of positive response from respondents throughout the region, so much so that it is the very vagueness and breadth of meanings given to the word that makes it possible to treat it as a near-synonym for “our regime” in some of the items in Table 1. People who like the d word do not necessarily subscribe to the values that political scientists associate with that word, and people who subscribe to those values do not necessarily respond favorably to the word. This is illustrated by the fact that Thailand and Japan occupy reversed positions in Tables 1 and 4. The Thai public responds to the word democracy with the strongest enthusiasm and the Japanese public with the least; but the Japanese public subscribes most strongly to substantive values of equality, accountability, and liberty and the Thai public least.

Correlates of traditional and democratic values. I noted above that countries with higher levels of traditional values had lower levels of democratic values. I suggested that this reflects the influence of social changes associated with modernization, such as urbanization, rising incomes, and rising levels of education. Theory and comparative research suggest that such socio-economic changes bring about value changes away from

²⁰ Factor analysis confirms that the democratic values questions load on one dimension (to be reconfirmed).

²¹ For further analysis consistent with this view, see the Thailand country chapter by Robert B. Albritton and Thawilwadee Bureekul in *How East Asians View Democracy*.

²² The contribution of socialism to Chinese ideas of democracy is discussed in Tianjian Shi’s chapter on China in *How East Asians View Democracy*.

conflict avoidance toward interest assertiveness, and away from prioritizing collective interests toward prioritizing individual interests. They also contribute to the rise of the kinds of values tested in the EAB's democratic values battery. Such value changes occur partly through new personal experiences (individuals change their beliefs after they move to the cities or take up industrial employment) and partly by virtue of generational replacement (younger generations have different socialization and educational experiences which train them in different values from those of their elders).²³

These causal mechanisms function, and can be observed, at the macro (societal) level, as we have done above in comparing the rank-ordering of countries in different tables, but also at the micro (individual) level, which we undertake in Table 5. The table's left-hand panel describes the bivariate relationships between additive scales of traditional and democratic values and some standard socio-demographic variables, the first four of which directly reflect the effects of modernization.

(Table 5 about here)

The first thing to notice in this panel is that the signs on the correlation coefficients are always the opposite for traditional and democratic values. Any social process that promotes a decline in belief in traditional values also promotes increased belief in democratic values. Across Asia, the better educated, more urban, higher income, and younger respondents are less likely to hold traditional social values and more likely to hold democratic political values than their opposites. Males are also somewhat more likely than females to be non-traditional and pro-democratic, but the role of this variable is statistically less marked. It is generally the case that males get involved in modernization earlier than females, for example by going to secondary school or college or by moving to cities.

While these relationships hold generally true across the region, they are markedly stronger in the three Chinese societies than elsewhere, followed by the other two societies with Confucian heritages (Korea and Japan), and the relationships grow weaker in the remaining three societies, which are of non-Confucian backgrounds. This is an interesting illustration of the fact that a social science theory can be generally true, yet operate with greater or lesser intensity in different contexts. If one asks what is the salient difference among the eight societies that might explain this pattern of differential cultural impact of modernization, the first answer that comes to mind is the different importance given to education in each respective cultural heritage. But this is another of the many loose ends that this paper has to leave unexplored.

The second panel of the table explores some of the effects that traditional social values and democratic political values in turn exert upon other political attitudes and perceptions. (Causation in the other direction is ruled out by virtue of the assumption in culture theory that social and political values are early-established, deep-seated, and slow

²³ For the first mechanism, see e.g., Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: The Free Press, 1958), and Alex Inkeles and David Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974). For the second, see, among his other works, Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Post-Modernization: Cultural, Economic, and Social Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

changing, while the kinds of attitudes and perceptions tested in the second panel are more recently established and change more easily in response to political stimuli.) Here again the signs on the coefficients are usually opposed, showing that traditional and democratic values have opposite effects. In general, those holding traditional values are less psychologically involved in politics, have lower levels of political efficacy, have less political trust, view leaders as less responsive, and (albeit less consistently) tend to perceive less progress in political rights and democracy, while those with democratic values tend to have the opposite set of attitudes perceptions.

Again the three culturally Chinese cases tend to display the dominant patterns more strongly than do the other cases. In some cells of the second panel, however, the major patterns are weak or, in some cases, even reversed. For example, institutional trust is enhanced by traditional values and decreased by democratic values, rather than the reverse, in four of the political systems: Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, and Japan. The probable explanation for this is that more pro-democracy citizens are more critical of the regimes in these countries, more aware of corruption, and more skeptical of the incumbents, while more traditional-minded respondents are more deferential toward the authorities. Other anomalous findings in the second panel can probably be explained for the most part in similar ways.

Overall, Table 5 shows that although political culture is complex, it does identifiably exist and it has some coherence (the citizen who leans more to tradition tends to lean less to democratic values); that culture responds to processes of social change, although with lag and unevenly across social processes and specific values; and that cultural values have effects on other political attitudes.

Effects of culture on political participation. Culture, then, exists, and to some extent it matters.²⁴ But how does it matter? We have shown that values affect certain individual attitudes toward politics. Do respondents with different sets of values and beliefs also behave differently in their political actions?

If the dependent variable is the most common form of citizen-level political activity – voting, and some associated activities in the electoral arena – the answer, according to Table 6, is “only a little.” The dependent variable in Table 6 is an additive scale of three activities: casting a vote in the most recent election, attending a campaign rally, and trying to persuade someone how to vote. The table is not intended as a model of electoral behavior.²⁵ It merely tries to see whether the two cultural syndromes we have identified can help explain who engages in electoral activity and who does not, when a few other obvious variables are controlled for. The control variables are basic socio-demographic variables that have been found to have some effect on electoral behavior in other political systems and which are available in our dataset with few missing cases, so that we can avoid having missing cases bias the results we are curious about – the impact of culture on behavior.

²⁴ There is of course a large debate in the social sciences on whether culture matters. See, among others, Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington, *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

²⁵ For an example of such a model see, for example, Norman Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter*, enlarged edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979). The EAB questionnaire did not include all the variables needed to construct models of voting, because it was not designed as a voting study.

(Table 6 about here)

The regression shows that cultural values have little effect on electoral participation. One might have hypothesized that persons holding traditional values would be less likely to vote because they are deferential – or the opposite, that they would be more likely to vote because they are easily mobilized. The second hypothesis does hold true in Japan, the Philippines, and Mongolia, although the effect is strong only in the Philippines. One might have hypothesized that people holding democratic values would be more likely to vote because they believe in the citizen’s right to influence politics – or the opposite, that in certain political systems they are less likely to vote because they are alienated from the regime’s authoritarianism or corruption. The former of the two hypotheses pans out in Hong Kong and Japan, but not elsewhere. In short, political culture has some effect on electoral behavior, but the effect is not strong.

Effects of culture on regime support. This brings us to the key question of this paper. How do cultural values affect support for regimes in Asia? Here the answer, as shown in Table 7, is more affirmative than was the case for electoral participation. Traditional social values and democratic values each have a strong impact on most forms of regime support in most of our eight Asian countries, even after a series of other relevant variables are controlled for. Overall, however, the impact of culture on regime support is more important than the impact of perceived regime performance. Cultural legitimacy matters more than performance legitimacy.

(Table 7 about here)

The importance of culture for regime support is revealed by calculating a country-by-country series of regression models, in which each of the variables in Table 1 is treated as a dependent variable. Traditional social values and democratic values are entered into each regression as independent variables. Likewise included as independent variables are the two measures of perceived regime performance from Table 2, so that we can compare the impact of performance to the impact of culture on regime support.

In order to isolate the effects of culture and performance, eight other variables were entered into the regression models as control variables, thus purging the regression coefficients for the two cultural variables and the two policy performance variables of variance that should instead be attributed to these other variables. The control variables are sex, age group, years of education, urban or rural residence, social capital (measured by the number of formal groups plus the number of private groups the respondent reports belonging to), psychological involvement in politics (measured as described in the notes to Table 5), the respondent’s evaluation of the nation’s economic condition today on a scale of 5 from very good to very bad, and the respondent’s evaluation of his/her personal economic condition today on the same scale. The rationale for selecting these particular control variables is that each has a plausible connection to regime support and none of them appears in the dataset with a large number of missing values, which carry the risk of biasing the results.

Table 7 leaves out a large amount of information from the regressions in order to highlight the findings of interest here. The table includes the standardized regression coefficients for only the four variables that we are investigating, leaving out the regression coefficients for the control variables for ease of comprehension and because they are not the focus of our interest here; and it includes only those coefficients that are statistically significant. Type faces are used to distinguish among three different levels of statistical significance, with the bold-faced regression coefficients displaying the highest level of statistical significance. The adjusted R indicates how well the entire suite of independent and control variables taken together explains the dependent variable; the n indicates how many valid cases were entered into that regression equation for that dependent variable for that country.

The column at the right deserves our attention first. It summarizes how many times (out of a possible 8, since there are eight countries) the variable in question achieved a statistically significant level in explaining that particular dependent variable. Thus for the variable, “Our form of government is best for us,” democratic values had a statistically significant impact eight times out of a possible eight, traditional social values seven times out of a possible eight, democratic performance twice, and policy performance zero times (hence it is not shown). If a variable was statistically significant every possible time, it would be significant 54 times (since there are seven different dependent variables and eight countries, minus two dependent variables that were not available for China). Running down the last column we see that democratic values achieved statistical significance 45 of these possible 54 times, traditional social values 38 times, democratic performance 23 times, and policy performance 15 times. In other words, pre-existing cultural attitudes are more consistently important in affecting regime support than is perceived regime performance: legitimacy depends more on culture than on performance.

How does culture affect legitimacy? The first point to be noticed is that the signs on traditional social values and democratic values are invariably reversed. This is the same pattern we noted in Table 5. There we showed that people who have more traditional values are likely to have less democratic values and vice versa. In Table 7 we see that the effect upon regime support of holding relatively strong traditional values is always the opposite of the effect of holding relatively strong democratic values.

The ways in which these two sets of values affect various measures of regime support make sense. On our best measure of diffuse regime support, “our form of government is best for us,” throughout the region people holding stronger traditional values hold more negative attitudes toward their regimes and those holding more democratic values hold more positive attitudes. This reflects the fact that all the regimes claim to be democratic, and five of them had recently gone through triumphant democratic transitions at the time of our survey. The effect is often highly statistically significant and in several cases it is large (over .200).²⁶

On the other hand, the people holding democratic values are *less* rather than more likely than those holding traditional values to be “satisfied with how democracy works in

²⁶ In general, when a regression model is exploratory and we are not sure it includes all the most relevant causal variables, the fact of statistical significance is the more reliable finding, while the size of the coefficient should be taken less seriously, because it could be strongly affected by introducing a variable that is currently omitted from the equation.

our country.” Here it is important to remember that the assessment of democratic values was done without using the “d” word (see Table 4). The measure does not assess people’s approval of democracy as a symbol or idea but their adherence to substantive values like political equality and accountability. Table 7 shows that believers in these values are dissatisfied with the state of affairs in Hong Kong, China, Korea, and Thailand – all of them places where democratic practices fell short of democratic rhetoric at the time of our surveys. In Korea, China, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand, there was a statistically significant tendency for respondents holding more traditional values to be more satisfied with how democracy worked. Put otherwise, they were less demanding of the regime, and more deferential to the authorities.

Turning to the third set of regressions in the table, the findings are again not surprising. With high levels of statistical significance and large coefficients, those holding democratic values were more likely to reject authoritarian options and those holding traditional values were less likely to do so. Likewise through the remainder of the table: democratic values rendered respondents more committed to democratic governance and more skeptical of existing regimes, while traditional values had the opposite effects. Throughout, the impact of perceived policy performance was less. One way to read the implications of these patterns is that Asian regimes are more robust when they face downturns in policy performance than is often thought, but over the long run they are vulnerable to shifts in deeper values.

These pan-regional effects are, broadly speaking, less marked in China than elsewhere. The Chinese coefficients work in the same direction as those in the other countries, but they are often significant at a lower level and either small or middling in size compared to the size of the coefficients in other countries. I want to refine the table before over-interpreting this comparison, but if it survives further testing, the implication might be two-fold.

First, at the present time diffuse support for the Chinese regime is more consistent across cultural groups than is the case elsewhere in Asia. People believing in democratic values and people believing in traditional values give not-so-different levels of diffuse support to the regime. Instead, as we saw in Table 1, support is generally high. To judge from the table, this is not because of any massive impact of perceived regime performance on diffuse support – e.g., not due to the regime’s economic performance. It may be due to the impact of regime propaganda, or to the impact of nationalistic feelings, or to other causes which I have yet to investigate.

But second, it remains the case that Chinese citizens who believe in political equality and accountability – who subscribe to democratic values when the “d” word is not invoked – are more critical of the regime than others. If the number of such persons increases over time (as Table 5 suggests that it will), *and* if the impact of cultural values increases to levels closer to those they exert in the other countries in Table 7, then one can expect the Chinese regime over time to be increasingly vulnerable to a weakening of its currently robust legitimacy.

I do not mean by this to imply that democratization will necessarily follow. Tables 1 and 7 suggest that regimes like Taiwan and Japan with very critical citizenries can still survive. And I have argued elsewhere that the Chinese regime has shown resourcefulness in adapting to challenges to its survival.²⁷

²⁷ Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience,” *Journal of Democracy*

Conclusions. Culture matters in politics. Its impact, however, is complex. It does not matter to the same extent in every aspect of politics nor to the same extent or in the same manner in each country. Culture, as we measured it here in two syndromes, is more influential in helping to explain patterns of regime support than in helping to explain electoral behavior. Within the ambit of regime support, it influences certain aspects or dimensions of regime support more than others. And it does this more markedly in some countries than in others.

Since this is a partial report from an ongoing research project, I am not ready to offer an answer to the puzzle I posed at the outset, about the high level of diffuse support for the Chinese regime. The tentative conclusion I can offer at this point is that the Chinese regime draws support both from its economic performance and from the prevalence of traditional values. As values change, at any given level of perceived performance, we can expect regime legitimacy to come under greater challenge. But we should not wait for this with bated breath, because diffuse regime support in China starts from a high point and still has a very long way to fall before it would converge with the levels of diffuse support found in most of the region's democracies.

Appendix. Sampling and Fieldwork Methods

This appendix briefly describes the East Asian Barometer's sampling and fieldwork methods. For a fuller description see Appendix I in *How East Asians View Democracy*. Additional details can be found on the project website at <http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/surveys/SurveyMethods.htm>.

China survey. The China survey was conducted in March-June, 2002, by Tianjian Shi in cooperation with the Institute of Sociology of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. It yielded 3183 valid cases out of 3,752 sampled cases for a response rate of 84.1%. The sample represents the adult population over eighteen years of age residing in family households at the time of the survey, excluding those living in the Tibetan Autonomous Region. A stratified multistage area sampling procedure with probabilities proportional to size measures (PPS) was employed to select the sample.

The Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) employed in the sample design are counties (*xian*) in rural areas and cities (*shi*) in urban areas. In province-level municipalities, districts (*qu*) were used as PSU. The secondary sampling units (SSUs) were townships (*xiang*) and districts (*qu*) or streets (*jiedao*). The third stage of selection was geared to administrative villages in rural areas and neighborhood committees (*juweihui*) or community committees (*shequ weiyuanhui*) in urban areas. We selected 249 administrative villages and 247 neighborhood or community committees in the third stage of the sampling process. A total of 496 sampling units were selected. Households were used at the fourth stage of sampling.

The response rate for urban areas was lower than that for the rural areas. For urban area, the response rate was 82.5%, and rural areas it was 86.5%.

Weighting variables for the sample were calculated along the three dimensions of gender, age, and educational level using the method of raking.²⁸

Retired middle school teachers were employed as interviewers for the survey. Mandarin was used for most interviews. Interviewers were authorized to hire interpreters to deal with respondents unable to understand Mandarin.

Hong Kong survey. The Hong Kong survey was conducted in September-December, 2001, by Kuan Hsin-chi and Lau Siu-kai under the auspices of the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong. It yielded 811 valid cases out of 1651 sampled cases for a response rate of 49.12%. The target population was defined as Hong Kong people aged 20 to 75 residing in permanent residential living quarters in built-up areas.

The sampling method involved a multi-stage design. First, a sample of 2,000 residential addresses was selected from the computerized Sub-Frame of Living Quarters maintained by the Census and Statistics Department. In selecting the sample, living quarters were first stratified with respect to area and type of housing. The sample of quarters selected was of the EPSEM (equal probability of selection method) type and was random in the statistical sense. Where a selected address had more than one household with persons aged 20 to 75, or was a group household (such as a hostel), a random

²⁸ Raking is a procedure to bring row and column totals of a table of survey estimates into close agreement with independent estimates of those totals by adjusting the entries in the table.

numbers table pre-attached to each address was used to select one household or one person. If the drawn household had more than one person aged 20 to 75, a random selection grid, i.e., a modified Kish Grid, was employed to select one interviewee. A face-to-face interview was conducted to complete the questionnaire. The interviewers were recruited from the student body of the Chinese University.

The gender and educational attainment distributions of the sample did not differ significantly from those of the target population. Raking was used to generate a weighting variable to correct for the underrepresentation of the younger age group (aged between 20 and 39) in the sample.

Japan survey. The Japan survey was conducted by the Department of Social Psychology, University of Tokyo, in January-February 2003. It yielded 1,418 valid cases out of 2,000 sampled cases for a response rate of 70.9%. The target population was the voting age population in all 47 prefectures. The method was a two-stage random sample from the population of individual males and females 20 years and older throughout Japan.

The first-stage sampling units were districts established in the 2000 national census. The number of units was calculated so that the sample size in each unit would be about 13. This led to a first-stage sample of 157 districts, consisting of 122 cities or wards and 35 towns or villages. In the second stage of sampling, respondents were selected from voter lists, or in some districts complete residence registries, using an equal interval selection method. Voter lists and residence registries are substitutable because the proportion of residents disqualified from voting is small.

Fieldwork was undertaken by regularly employed interviewers of Central Research Services, a marketing and public opinion research firm. The interviewers were trained survey fieldworkers, who received an additional orientation session about this survey.

The sample is weighted for gender, age and education by the method of raking.

Korea survey. The South Korea survey was conducted in February 2003, by the Survey Research Center at Korea University. The survey population was defined as all Korean nationals aged 20 and older with the right to vote residing in the territory of South Korea, except the island of Cheju-do, which has 1.2% of the population.

Sampling was conducted in four stages. At the first stage, the country was geographically stratified into sixteen strata – seven metropolitan cities and nine provinces (*do*). Each province was further stratified into two sub-strata (urban and rural). At the second stage, the administrative subdivisions (*dong*) of the respective metropolitan cities and those (*dong* or *ri*) of the respective provincial sub-strata were identified. From these subdivisions preliminary sampling locations were randomly selected according to probability proportionate to their population size. At the third stage, primary sampling units (*ban* or villages) were randomly selected from the respective preliminary sampling locations. Six to eight households from a *ban* and twelve to fifteen from a village were randomly selected. Finally, at the household level, the interviewers were instructed to select for interview the person whose birthday came next.

Of 2,575 voters sampled, we completed face-to-face interviews with 1,500, registering a response rate of 58%.

Fieldwork was undertaken by regularly employed interviewers of the Garam Research Institute. Interviews were conducted in Korean. The mean length of interviews was 60 minutes, with a range from 50 to 90 minutes.

The sub-samples matched the population segments with respect to gender, age, and region of residence, so no weighting variable was constructed.

Mongolia survey. The Mongolia survey was conducted in October-December, 2002, by the Academy of Political Education, in cooperation with the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences. The Academy of Political Education is a non-government, non-profit, non-partisan institution established in 1993, to support and strengthen democratization and civil society in Mongolia.²⁹

A one-stage probability sample was constructed of Mongolian citizens aged 18 and older. We selected 1150 out of Mongolian's six provinces (*aimag*) and two cities with a probability proportional to size, based upon population data in the *Mongolian Statistical Yearbook* (National Statistical Office of Mongolia: Ulaanbaatar, 2001). As a supplement, 2000 parliamentary election voter registration lists from the General Election Commission of Mongolia were used to check the number of citizens aged 18 and older in selected provinces and cities.

A selection table was used to select the individual respondent within the sampled household. A sampled respondent who was not available was replaced by another respondent from the original sample. The survey yielded 1144 valid cases out of 1200 sampled cases for a response rate of 95.3%.

The interviewers were 24 staff of the Academy (22 researchers and 2 technical staff) and 20 volunteer students of sociology from the Mongolian National University. Interviewers underwent one week of training in September 2002. The survey administered the project's core questionnaire, as translated from English to Mongolian, with a number of adjustments to accommodate Mongolian election dates and political party names. Questionnaires were administered face to face, in the Mongolian language.

Compared to national population statistics from the 2000 census, the sample overrepresented respondents aged 40-64, females, and those from certain regions. The sample is therefore weighted by the method of raking to correct for these three biases.

Philippines survey. The Philippines survey was conducted March 4-23, 2002, by Social Weather Stations, an independent, non-stock, non-profit social research organization. It yielded 1200 valid cases out of 3,059 sampled cases for a response rate of 39.2%.

In the conduct of the survey, the Philippines was divided into four study areas: the National Capital Region (NCR), Balance Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. The targeted sample size of each study area was set at 300 voting-age adults (18 years old and older), for a total sample size of 1,200. Within each of the four study areas, multi-stage sampling with probability proportional to population size (PPS) was used in the selection of sample spots. In the NCR, 60 precincts were sampled from among the 17 cities and

²⁹ The activities of the Academy have been funded by, among others, the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation of Germany, the Asia Foundation, the Soros Foundation, and UNDP. The Academy's website is www.academy.org.mn.

municipalities in such a way that each city or municipality was assigned a number of precincts that was roughly proportional to its population size. An additional provision was that at least one precinct must be chosen within each municipality. Precincts were then selected at random from within each municipality by PPS. In the other three study areas, each study area was divided into regions. Sample provinces for each region were selected by PPS, with the additional provision that each region must have at least one sampled province. Within each study area, 15 municipalities were allocated among the sample provinces, and selected from within each sample province with PPS, again with the provision that each province must include at least one municipality. Sixty sample spots for each of the major areas were allocated among the sample municipalities. The spots were distributed in such a way that each municipality was assigned a number of spots roughly proportional to its population size. Sample precincts (urban) or sample barangays (rural) within each sample municipality were selected using simple random sampling.

Within each sampled unit, interval sampling from a randomly chosen starting point was used to draw five households. In each selected household, a respondent was randomly chosen among the household members of a given sex (to assure a 50/50 stratification by sex) who were 18 years of age and older, using a Kish grid. A respondent not contacted during the first attempt was visited for a second time. If the respondent remained unavailable, a substitute was interviewed who possessed the same attributes as the original respondent in terms of sex, age bracket, socio-economic class, and work status. The substitute respondent was taken from another household beyond the covered intervals in the sample precinct or barangay.

The questionnaire was incorporated within an omnibus survey, in which the EAB module was asked first, followed by a number of items on other topics. The survey used the face-to-face mode of interview. The EAB module was translated from English into Tagalog, Cebuano, Ilonggo, Ilocano, and Bicolano; Philippine-specific questionnaire items were translated from a Tagalog master version into the other four local languages (as well as into English to serve as a check on the meaning of the Tagalog original). All five Philippine languages (i.e., excluding English) were used in administering the questionnaire, depending on the language spoken by the respondent.

Interviewers were professional interviewers of NFO-Trends, a private market research survey group.

Since the sample contained 300 individuals from each of four unequally-sized major areas of the country, weighting variables were constructed to weight each case proportionately to the population size of the area where the individual was interviewed.

Taiwan survey. The Taiwan survey was conducted in June-July, 2001, by the Comparative Study of Democratization and Value Changes Project Office, National Taiwan University. The target population was defined as ROC citizens aged 20 and over who had the right to vote. This population was sampled according to the Probabilities Proportionate to Size (PPS) method in three stages: towns/counties, villages/*li* and individual voters. Taiwan was divided into eight statistically distinct divisions. Within each division four, six, or eight towns/counties were selected; from each of these two villages/*li* were selected; and in each of these between thirteen and sixteen individuals

(not households) were sampled. In the municipalities of Taipei and Kaohsiung, only *li* and individuals were sampled.

The sampling design called for 1416 valid interviews. In order to replace respondents who could not be contacted or who refused to be interviewed, a supplementary pool of fifteen times the size of the original sample was taken. If a respondent could not be interviewed, he or she was replaced by a person from the supplementary pool of the same gender and age. 714 of the original sample of 1416 were successfully interviewed for a success rate of 50.4% for the original sample. To produce the other 701 successful cases, a total of 1727 supplementary respondents were contacted. Overall, we attempted to interview a total of 3143 people and successfully completed 1415 interviews for a response rate of 45.0%.

The interviews were conducted by 140 university students. 64.8% of the interviews were conducted predominantly or exclusively in Mandarin. 14.1% were conducted predominantly or exclusively in Taiwanese. 20.5% of the interviews used a mixture of Mandarin and Taiwanese. The remaining 0.6% were conducted in other languages.

A chi-squared test showed that the procedure oversampled citizens between the ages of 30 and 50, and those with educational levels of senior high school and above. Although the sample passed the chi-squared test for gender, it contained about four percent fewer males and four percent more females than expected. Weighting variables for the sample were therefore calculated along the three dimensions of gender, age, and educational level using the method of raking.

Thailand survey. The Thailand survey was conducted in October-November, 2001, by King Prajadhipok's Institute, an independent, publicly-funded research institute chartered by the Thai Parliament.³⁰

The sampling procedure had three stages. In the first stage, 50 legislative constituencies were randomly selected from among 400 across the nation. In the second stage, 100 voting districts (precincts) were randomly selected from within the 50 constituencies. Because Thai constituencies and districts are of relatively equal population size, it was not necessary to use probability-proportionate-to-size methods. Finally, respondents' names were randomly sampled from voting lists from these districts. All persons aged 18 and over are named on these voting lists, with the exception of a few small categories disenfranchised under the voting law. If selected respondents were unavailable, substitutes of the same gender were obtained from names on either side of the chosen respondent on the voting list. Such substitutions occurred in 116 cases. The procedure yielded 1546 cases. After disqualifying 15 for non-completion of the questionnaire, the sample was reduced to 1531.

The interviewers were students at regional universities. The interviews were conducted in the local dialects, including Malay in the southern provinces, except when the respondent preferred to speak in Central Thai.

The sample was consistent with census data with respect to gender and region, but failed the chi-squared test with respect to age. A weighting variable was constructed using gender and age statistics.

³⁰ For more information on the Institute, see <http://el.kpi.ac.th/kpien/>.

Table 1. Regime Support and Democratic Support in Asia

(Percent of total sample who express support)

		Thailand	China	Mongolia	Taiwan	Philippines	Korea	Hong Kong	Japan	Average
Regime support	Our form of gov't best for us	68.2%	94.4%	69.8%	67.3%	53.6%	36.0%	54.5%	24.3%	58.5%
	Satisfied with how democracy works in our country	90.4%	81.7%	69.8%	53.4%	52.5%	61.8%	57.6%	49.0%	64.5%
Support for democracy	Rejects authoritarian alternatives	77.3%	74.3%	75.4%	82.7%	70.4%	86.6%	83.9%	95.4%	80.7%
	Commitment to democracy	92.2%	66.1%	84.0%	50.1%	73.5%	76.6%	52.0%	74.9%	71.2%
Related attitudes	Satisfied with current gov't	89.7%	N/A	55.2%	41.3%	58.5%	35.0%	34.6%	37.1%	50.2%
	Trusts gov't institutions	64.3%	72.2%	52.0%	39.2%	41.4%	28.6%	63.2%	31.3%	49.0%
	Expects democratic progress	96.2%	96.7%	92.1%	87.5%	82.3%	95.0%	59.1%	85.0%	86.7%
	Average	82.5%	79.3%	71.3%	63.6%	63.0%	62.1%	61.2%	58.7%	67.7%

Notes:

Source: 2001-2003 East Asia Barometer Surveys

"Rejects authoritarian alternatives"=respondent rejects at least half of the authoritarian alternatives on which s/he expresses an opinion; "Commitment to democracy"=respondent agrees with three or more of five preferred positive attitudes toward democracy; "Trusts government institutions"=summed trust scores for five government institutions is more positive than negative; "Expects democratic progress"=on a scale of degree of democracy from 1 to 10, respondent expects regime five years from now to be equally or more democratic than present regime.

Bold (red) numbers are at or above the average for that row, nonbold (green) numbers below the average

N/A=not asked.

Table 2. Difference in Perceived Performance of Current and Past Regimes		
(Percent perceiving improvement minus percent perceiving worsening)		
	Democratic performance	Policy performance
Thailand	69.7	57.3
Japan	60.8	15.2
China	53.1	-8.2
Mongolia	51.8	-16.8
Taiwan	50.0	-11.1
Korea	31.5	-23.1
Philippines	26.8	8.9
Hong Kong	-24.1	1.3

Notes:

Source: 2001-2003 East Asian Barometer Surveys

Entries are "percentage differential index" (PDI): the percent of respondents perceiving improvement minus the percent perceiving worsening.

Democratic performance includes freedom of speech, freedom of association, equal treatment of citizens by government, providing citizens with popular influence over government, and providing an independent judiciary. Policy performance includes working against corruption, providing law and order, providing economic development, and providing economic equality.

"Past regime" is the regime before the country's transition to democracy in the five new democracies; for Japan it is the pre-1945 regime, for China the pre-1979 regime, for Hong Kong the pre-1997 regime.

Table 3. Traditional Social Values in East Asian Countries									
(Percent of those answering who agree or strongly agree)									
	Hong Kong	Taiwan	Japan	Philippines	Korea	China	Thailand	Mongolia	Average
For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second.	90.2%	86.1%	72.7%	79.0%	69.9%	91.0%	88.1%	73.6%	81.3%
If there is a quarrel, we should ask an elder to resolve the dispute.	36.9%	68.9%	66.2%	75.8%	44.2%	72.4%	76.7%	70.9%	64.0%
When one has a conflict with a neighbor, the best way to deal with it is to accommodate the other person.	67.1%	46.1%	75.4%	45.8%	71.4%	71.9%	50.7%	82.3%	63.8%
A person should not insist on his own opinion if his co-workers disagree with him.	53.4%	63.0%	61.4%	57.0%	61.4%	51.6%	62.3%	66.7%	59.6%
Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask.	23.6%	23.7%	43.5%	29.2%	47.5%	34.2%	37.5%	69.0%	38.5%
When a mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law come into conflict, even if the mother-in-law is in the wrong, the husband should still persuade his wife to obey his mother.	37.7%	48.4%	23.3%	27.9%	---	53.5%	43.3%	26.9%	37.3%
When hiring someone, even if a stranger is more qualified, the opportunity should still be given to relatives and friends.	35.2%	28.4%	33.6%	24.9%	26.3%	36.7%	46.6%	65.6%	37.2%
Wealth and poverty, success and failure are all determined by fate.	40.1%	27.3%	26.7%	55.1%	29.5%	24.4%	43.5%	46.5%	36.6%
A man will lose face if he works under a female supervisor.	7.0%	9.7%	15.4%	23.6%	26.7%	8.5%	46.7%	30.3%	21.0%
Average percent traditional	43.5%	44.6%	46.5%	46.5%	47.1%	49.4%	55.0%	59.1%	49.0%

Notes:

Source: 2001-2003 East Asian Barometer Surveys

Percentages of 50 or above in boldface (red), percentages below 50 unbolded (green).

Table 4. Democratic Values in East Asian Countries									
(Percent of those answering who give the pro-democratic answer)									
	Japan	Hong Kong	Korea	Taiwan	China	Philippines	Mongolia	Thailand	Average
People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly educated people [political equality] (agree).	90.3%	90.1%	72.2%	90.2%	91.6%	55.4%	83.0%	15.0%	73.5%
When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch [separation of powers] (disagree).	76.3%	55.2%	69.0%	66.6%	39.9%	38.7%	74.2%	40.3%	57.5%
Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions [government accountability] (disagree).	85.7%	67.3%	52.9%	66.1%	39.3%	47.5%	34.5%	41.8%	54.4%
The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society [political liberty] (disagree).	70.3%	69.2%	60.1%	71.5%	36.8%	39.7%	23.2%	47.3%	52.3%
If the government is constantly checked by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things [separation of powers] (disagree).	62.1%	55.7%	53.8%	29.6%	55.4%	49.9%	41.3%	47.8%	49.4%
If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything [government accountability] (disagree).	68.3%	60.5%	37.2%	62.4%	47.0%	46.9%	30.7%	25.1%	47.3%
Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups [political pluralism] (disagree).	42.4%	52.1%	64.8%	38.1%	24.5%	46.2%	31.5%	16.2%	39.5%

If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic [political pluralism] (disagree).	44.2%	45.2%	52.8%	25.0%	36.9%	43.4%	19.9%	23.7%	36.4%
Average percent democratic	67.4%	61.9%	57.9%	56.2%	46.4%	46.0%	42.3%	32.1%	51.3%

Notes:

Source: 2001-2003 East Asian Barometer Surveys

Percentages of 50 or above in boldface (red), percentages below 50 unbolded (green).

Notes in square brackets indicate the democratic principle involved; notes in parentheses indicate the direction of the response coded as pro-democratic.

Table 5. Correlates of Traditional and Democratic Values											
Socioeconomic status						Political attitudes and perceptions					
	Better educated	Higher income	Urban	Older	Male	Involved in politics	Internal efficacy	Inst'l trust	Leaders responsive	Increased pol rights	Democratic progress
China											
<i>Traditional values</i>	-.462	-.207	-.301	.241		-.240	-.071	-.092	-.174	.047	-.055
<i>Democratic values</i>	.367	.182	.287	-.198	.059	.167	.071	.140	.138		
Taiwan											
<i>Traditional values</i>	-.395	-.271	-.167	.414		-.150	-.221	.144	-.086	.162	
<i>Democratic values</i>	.246	.196	.092	-.219	.057	.181	.190	-.112	.099	-.073	
Hong Kong											
<i>Traditional values</i>	-.426	-.227	N/A	.322	.088	-.081	-.189	.074			
<i>Democratic values</i>	.453	.328	N/A	-.309		.079	.222	-.120	.079		
Korea											
<i>Traditional values</i>	-.211	-.152	-.096	.256		.116	-.218	.123	-.243		-.093
<i>Democratic values</i>	.152	.201	.119	-.166			.226	-.097	.231		.074
Japan											
<i>Traditional values</i>	-.212			.274			-.121	.086	-.115		
<i>Democratic values</i>	.222	.105	-.016	-.092	.105	.165	.297	-.116	.287	-.099	.065
Philippines											
<i>Traditional values</i>	-.090	-.178	.072		.057		-.071		-.132	-.105	
<i>Democratic values</i>		.067	-.069				.262		.292	.072	
Thailand											
<i>Traditional values</i>	-.271	-.280	-.098	.155		-.063	-.223		-.231	-.051	.120
<i>Democratic values</i>	.157	.212	.185				.210	.069	.199		-.181
Mongolia											
<i>Traditional values</i>	-.094	-.077	-.106	.094		.058	-.139	-.071	-.135		
<i>Democratic values</i>	.150	.073		-.121	.079	.063	.244		.264		

Notes:

Source: 2001-2003 East Asia Barometer Surveys

Dependent variables are additive scales of respondent's disagreement or agreement with traditional-value and democratic-value questionnaire items. The scale ranges from -9 to +9 for traditional values (Korea is pro-rated on a base of 8) and from -8 to +8 for democratic values.

Education measured in years, income in quintiles, age in five-year age groups, involvement in politics by expressing interest in politics and following news about politics, internal efficacy by response to four questions on one's ability to understand and participate in politics, institutional trust by expressed trust in five government institutions, leaders responsive by response to two questions on responsiveness of government leaders, increased political rights by perception current regime has improved access to up to five political rights, democratic progress by view that current regime is more democratic than previous one.

Entries are Pearson's correlation coefficients. Unbolded (green) numbers are significant at the .05 level, bolded (red) numbers at or above the .001 level. Blank cells indicate correlations without statistical significance. N/A=not applicable (no urban-rural variable in Hong Kong).

Table 6. Regression Analysis on Electoral Participation								
(Standardized regression coefficients)								
	China	Taiwan	Hong Kong	Korea	Japan	Thailand	Philippines	Mongolia
Male	.073							
Age group	.140	.181	.214	.314	.301	.088	.201	.147
Years of education	.096			.146	.100		.145	.099
Income quintile		.173			.075	-.067	-.092	.096
Urban		.067				-.176		-.195
Traditional values					.076		.160	.076
Democratic values			.127		.077			
adjusted R ²	.030	.057	.028	.074	.087	.044	.064	.075
N=	2071	1166	439	1203	949	1413	1173	1066

Notes:

Source: 2001-2003 East Asia Barometer Surveys

The dependent variable is the sum of three possible acts: voted in last election, attended campaign rally, tried to persuade someone how to vote. For independent variables, see notes to other tables.

Bold (red) numbers statistically significant at the .01 level; nonbold (green) at the .05 level; empty cells not statistically significant.

Table 7. Impact of Cultural Values and Perceived Regime Performance on Regime and Democratic Support

(Standardized regression coefficients)

	Japan		Hong Kong		Korea		China		Mongolia		Philippines		Taiwan		Thailand		# signif
	n= 1155	adjR= .053	n= 627	adjR= .197	n= 1496	adjR= .132	n= 2272	adjR= .046	n= 1076	adjR= .028	n= 1200	adjR= .050	n= 1109	adjR= .037	n1389	adjR= .161	
Our form of gov't best for us																	
Demo performance						.068				.090							2
Trad'l social values		-.155		-.097		-.122		-.076				-.131		-.110		-.066	7
Democratic values		.071		.283		.280		.057		.113		.146		.074		.322	8
Satisfied with how democracy works in our country	n= 1203	adjR= .029	n= 591	adjR= .149	n= 1487	adjR= .087	n= 2306	adjR= .209	n= 1089	adjR= .022	n= 1200	adjR= .063	n= 1156	adjR= .069	n= 1369	adjR= .090	
Demo performance				.203		-.081		-.086				-.073		-.065			5
Policy performance								.085				.068				-.109	3
Trad'l social values						.138		.054				.072		.119		.090	5
Democratic values				-.255		-.107		-.169								-.055	4
Rejects authoritarian alternatives	n= 1276	adjR= .212	n= 652	adjR= .343	n= 1497	adjR= .144	n= 2409	adjR= .147	n= 1097	adjR= .166	n= 1200	adjR= .106	n= 1197	adjR= .241	n= 1389	adjR= .083	
Demo performance		-.086								-.082							2
Policy performance										-.083							1
Trad'l social values				-.210		-.180		-.197		-.090		-.221		-.115		-.106	7
Democratic values		.374		.313		.270		.111		.326		.131		.310		.144	8
Commitment to democracy	n= 1278	adjR= .157	n= 667	adjR= .230	n= 1497	adjR= .086	N/A		n= 1101	adjR= .126	n= 1200	adjR= .083	n= 1218	adjR= .211	n= 1389	adjR= .056	

Demo performance	.130								.093				.163				4
Policy performance									-.093								2
Trad'l social values			.082		.151						.191				.070		4
Democratic values	-.293		-.234		-.218				-.281		-.131		-.168		-.170		7
Satisfied with current government	n= 1238	adjR= .131	n= 626	adjR= .151	n= 1492	adjR= .098			n= 1092	adjR= .096	n= 1198	adjR= .062	n= 1141	adjR= .203	n= 1385	adjR= .099	
Demo performance			.123		-.103		N/A						-.083				2
Policy performance					.066				-.071						-.101		3
Trad'l social values					.097				.081		.137		.118		.135		5
Democratic values	-.201		-.219		-.059				-.119				-.099		-.087		6
Trusts government institutions	n= 1278	adjR= .091	n= 667	adjR= .117	n= 1497	adjR= .101	n= 2608	adjR= .137	n= 1101	adjR= .128	n= 1200	adjR= .178	n= 1218	adjR= .095	n= 1389	adjR= .191	
Demo performance			.170				-.084		-.090								3
Policy performance							.096		-.122						-.107		3
Trad'l social values	.105				.130				.105		.156		.162		.157		6
Democratic values	-.100		-.121		-.070		-.144		-.081				-.112		-.163		7
Expects democratic progress	n= 1072	adjR= .033	n= 521	adjR= .109	n= 1493	adjR= .036	n= 2013	adjR= .121	n= 1006	adjR= .048	n= 1176	adjR= .024	n= 901	adjR= .023	n= 1302	adjR= .049	
Demo performance			.111				-.112		-.076		-.155		-.104				5
Policy performance							.139				.074				-.093		3
Trad'l social values			.096		-.085								-.101		.050		4
Democratic values			-.160				-.071		-.099						-.094		5

Notes:

Source: 2001-2003 East Asia Barometer Surveys

Bolded coefficients are significant at the .0001 level; those in italics are significant at the .001 level; those in regular typeface at the .05 level.